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INTRODUCTION 
LASS actions are no longer functional. In 1966, the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules embarked on a guarded experiment by 
anticipating how class actions might help enforce substantive laws. But 
in the years since, both Congress and the courts have twisted and cur-
tailed that experiment through increasingly strict certification standards. 
Now plaintiffs’ attorneys forgo a bevy of claims to buttress their certifi-
cation argument, bootstrap state law claims into federal causes of action, 
or bill class-certification questions at such high levels of generality that 
judges are confronted with an all-or-nothing proposition: to certify, or 
not. But these strict standards and corresponding tactics have evolved 
from a misguided focus on class members’ cohesiveness vis-à-vis one 
another and a failure by parties and courts alike to frame and adjudicate 
collectively what actually unites plaintiffs—a defendant’s conduct. 
This black-or-white thinking is not without consequence. Without 
certification, some litigation—like small-stakes consumer claims—will 
evaporate, which undermines enforcement goals. While economically 
viable claims will not wholly disappear, most injured people will not 
sue, which raises questions about realizing compensation and deterrence 
aims. And plaintiffs’ attorneys’ strategy of presenting only potentially 
certifiable causes of action can simultaneously risk disabling viable per-
sonal-injury claims and saddling subsequent proceedings with unpre-
dictable preclusion. Plaintiffs who do sue individually are likely to be 
corralled into multidistrict litigation, where judges face similar agency 
problems but lack clear policing authority absent class certification.1 
Certifying fewer classes also seemingly correlates with increased 
public regulation through state attorneys’ parens patriae power. While 
faithful attorneys general can fill a much maligned regulatory void,2 as 
the New York Times recently reported, they can also be purchased with 
timely campaign contributions.3 Moreover, when state attorneys proceed 
exclusively in state court, parens patriae actions incite further concerns 
about inconsistent outcomes, precluding private claims, and inadequate-
ly representing constituents. 
 
1 Without certifying a class, multidistrict litigation judges lack clear authority to award at-
torneys’ fees, ensure adequate representation, or approve settlements. See Elizabeth Cham-
blee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 117–18 (2015).  
2 Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623, 661–68 (2012). 
3 Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 
2014, at A1. 
C 
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Issue classes, where courts certify only certain claims or elements 
within those claims, can shed conventional black-or-white thinking 
about certification, equip private regulators with a procedural means to 
stymie these concerns, and advance substantive values. But issue classes 
palliate these pitfalls only insofar as judges abandon their misguided 
search for internal class unity and recognize that the defendant’s con-
duct, when uniform, is what bonds plaintiffs—not race, gender, identical 
injuries, or consistent damages. 
Reorienting traditional philosophies about class cohesion frees judges 
to think pragmatically about how to situate, sort, and adjudicate the 
components of claims and defenses by classifying them into their con-
stituent parts. Most legal elements can be cataloged according to wheth-
er they address a defendant’s alleged conduct or a plaintiff’s eligibility 
for relief. When a defendant’s conduct is nonindividuated toward plain-
tiffs or when substantive law permits plaintiffs to satisfy their eligibility 
for relief with aggregate proof, those components are ripe for aggregate 
treatment. Adjudicating those issues collectively may substantially ad-
vance all the claims, increase efficiency by reducing replicated proof, 
and minimize inconsistent verdicts. 
The promise of issue classes has not gone unnoticed.4 After a rocky de-
but in the 1990s with appellate decisions in Castano v. American Tobacco 
Co.5 and In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,6 issue classes are now experi-
encing a renaissance: They top the Rule 23 subcommittee’s agenda for 
potential rule changes and have been embraced by most circuit courts.7 
 
4 For example, the Bureau of National Affairs recently ran a “Special Report” featuring 
this author’s views. Perry Cooper, Issue Classes Swell in Consumer Suits: Are Potential Re-
wards Worth the Risk?, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 68 (Feb. 13, 2015). 
5 84 F.3d 734, 747–49 (5th Cir. 1996). 
6 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1995). 
7 Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. et al., “Weigh in Early.” A Town Hall Meeting with the Rule 23 
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Oct. 23, 2014), http://shop.american
bar.org/PersonifyImages/ProductFiles/211246/CEN4CAC_WebBrochure2.pdf. Thus far, the sub-
committee’s recognition of the emerging consensus and proposal for allowing appellate review 
largely follow this Article’s recommendations, and I am grateful to several subcommittee mem-
bers for taking the time to talk with me and for soliciting diverse views from wide-ranging audi-
ences on multiple occasions. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Agenda Book 
281–83 (2015), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%
20Books/Civil/CV2015-04.pdf. Even circuits with initial reluctance have revisited the issue. E.g., 
In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2014); In re Deep-
water Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 804 (5th Cir. 2014); see also infra Subsection III.A.1 (discussing 
circuit court opinions). 
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To date, however, scholars have done little beyond debating whether is-
sue classes should exist.8 
This Article changes the status quo with two principal contributions. 
First, after identifying how our existing procedural landscape fails to ef-
fectively redress nationwide misconduct, it constructs a unifying doctri-
nal theory as to when collectively resolving a single issue will be 
worthwhile. By reconsidering disjointed notions of class cohesion and 
recasting claims and defenses into defendant’s conduct or plaintiff’s eli-
gibility components, it demystifies the certification calculus and sets the 
stage for courts to certify classes that resolve key issues like a defend-
ant’s uniform conduct. This resists the all-or-nothing approach to certifi-
cation and coordinates the judicial response to jurisdictionally disaggre-
gated regulators. Second, it offers solutions to a medley of sticky legal 
and logistical quandaries such as how to compensate issue-class counsel 
when no common fund exists, ensure appropriate error-correction mech-
anisms through interlocutory appeals, coordinate fragmented public and 
private regulators, remand multidistrict litigation cases post-issue-
classes, and confront Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause con-
cerns. 
Part I begins by identifying and defining the central problem of to-
day’s regulatory terrain: When a national corporation behaves egre-
giously, that single act or series of acts gets distorted through several le-
gal prisms—jurisdictional restrictions, state law intricacies, and limited 
regulatory authority. Unless there is parity between the regulator’s au-
thority, the governing law, the court’s jurisdiction, and the corporation’s 
nationwide conduct, the net effect is to thwart coordinated enforcement. 
Defendants successfully capitalize on these imbalances to avoid class 
certification, at least until they want the umbrella of closure that settle-
ment classes provide. But this prompts settlement-oriented litigation. 
 
8 Compare Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 718, 721, 
723–24 (2014) (arguing, in part, that rule changes must occur before courts can implement 
issue classes), and Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 
62 DePaul L. Rev. 733, 735–40 (2013) (arguing against using issue classes), with Patricia 
Bronte et al., “Carving at the Joint”: The Precise Function of Rule 23(c)(4), 62 DePaul L. 
Rev. 745, 746–47 (2013) (positing that circuits splits on issue classes are resolving in favor 
of their use), Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certifi-
cation of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 Utah L. Rev. 249, 285–90 (suggest-
ing that Rule 23’s predominance analysis should accommodate issue certification), and Jen-
na C. Smith, “Carving at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class 
Actions, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1206–14 (2013) (analyzing cases to advocate using issue 
classes for consumer claims). 
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Plaintiffs’ attorneys sacrifice valuable claims to satisfy strict certifica-
tion standards, have little bargaining leverage with defendants, and rare-
ly test the claims’ merits. This risks undervaluing claims, undermining 
deterrence, and encouraging splintered enforcement, which escalates in-
adequate-representation concerns and prompts erratic preclusion deci-
sions. 
Class certification, adequate representation, and preclusion all boil 
down to whether a class is cohesive—a term that appears nowhere in 
Rule 23, but has emerged at the heart of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Part II irons out doctrinal difficulties with class cohesion and situates de-
fendant’s conduct as what unifies plaintiffs. When misconduct toward 
plaintiffs is uniform, adjudicating conduct components collectively pro-
motes consistency. But this also reveals a fundamental flaw when plain-
tiffs’ attorneys try to transform decentralized conduct toward different 
individuals into a group wrong by deploying “aggregate proof” through 
statistical or economic experts. Without a change in substantive law, the 
magic of mathematical models is just smoke and mirrors—models can-
not make disparate conduct uniform. 
Part III recognizes that, as usual, the devil is in the details. It thus 
breaks new ground by carefully parsing interrelated doctrinal, political, 
logistical, and constitutional concerns about issue classes. While issue 
classes can promote resource parity between parties and reduce incon-
sistent decisions as to the same conduct, certifying inconsequential is-
sues can generate undue settlement pressure. Yet, certifying only com-
ponents that resolve core questions and instituting appeals on the merits 
can alleviate this pressure. Conversely, without appropriate incentives, 
issue classes could lie stillborn in the hands of plaintiffs’ attorneys: Be-
cause issue classes do not produce a final judgment, there may be no 
common fund from which to collect fees. Adapting charging liens and 
the common-benefit doctrine, however, ensures compensation for class 
counsel if plaintiffs subsequently benefit from the issue class’s preclu-
sive effect. 
To be sure, issue classes can do only so much. Multiple regulators 
persist and procedural mechanisms cannot alter regulatory and jurisdic-
tional overlap. But, because issue classes work by precluding re-
litigation in follow-on proceedings, they can facilitate cross-pollination 
between (and consistency among) public and private enforcers in dis-
persed fora. Likewise, they offer a means for transferee judges to resolve 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
1860 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1855 
common conduct questions in multidistrict litigation when plenary clas-
ses are nonviable. 
I. REFRACTING UNIFORM MISCONDUCT 
Most businesses outgrew jurisdictional limits long ago. Nationwide 
conduct and conflicting state laws thus make it increasingly challenging 
for nonfederal entities like state attorneys general and private citizens to 
hold companies accountable for the full scope of any wrongdoing. When 
something goes awry with a product marketed nationwide, a mismatch 
occurs unless the regulator’s authority, the applicable substantive law, 
and the court’s jurisdiction all mirror the impact of defendant’s miscon-
duct. When they do align, a regulator with full resources can address 
wrongs appropriately. But parity between the regulator and the regulated 
is rare. Thus, suits concerning the same alleged wrongdoing are scat-
tered in state and federal courts throughout the country, making effec-
tive, predictable enforcement challenging. Accordingly, this Part begins 
by labeling and defining this prism effect, and then explores its impact 
on regulatory coordination, efficient resource use, substantive enforce-
ment of rights, and consistent outcomes. 
A. The Prism Effect: Distorting Defendant’s Conduct 
To illustrate the prism effect, consider a simple example: An engineer 
testing car safety finds a defect that can cause the vehicle to suddenly 
accelerate without the driver’s prompting. Important decisions follow 
such as whether the engineer properly reports the incident; how far up 
the chain of command that report goes; whether the engineering depart-
ment communicates with the legal department; and whether the compa-
ny issues an immediate recall or blames driver error.9 While the compa-
ny’s size and the number of affected people complicate these elementary 
questions, judges and juries routinely resolve issues like these every day. 
But the bigger the company and the larger its geographic reach, the more 
likely it is that these relatively straightforward conduct questions are ad-
 
9 In the Toyota acceleration litigation, Toyota initially blamed floor mats and trapped gas 
pedals for the problem when the root cause was a sticky gas pedal caused by plastic material 
inside the pedal. Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion Set-
tlement to End Probe of Accelerator Problems, Wash. Post (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/toyota-reaches-12-billion-settlement-to-
end-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html. 
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judicated ineffectively. As prisms distort light, the limits of a regulator’s 
authority, the boundaries of a court’s jurisdictional reach, and the diver-
gences among state laws refract defendant’s uniform conduct, adding to 
the regulatory complexity. 
Without parity between a regulator’s power and the defendant’s na-
tionwide conduct, enforcement can be fragmented and disjointed. For 
example, in the Toyota sudden-acceleration cases, multiple private at-
torneys filed class-action complaints before the recall,10 twenty-nine 
states’ attorneys general sued after the recall,11 and the U.S. Department 
of Justice fined the company $1.2 billion.12 But each entity’s regulatory 
scope differed dramatically: The Department of Justice’s reach mirrored 
Toyota’s nationwide sales as might a nationwide class action, but 
statewide classes and state attorneys general could govern Toyota’s con-
duct only insofar as it impacted a particular state. 
Most public and private litigants are constrained by a court’s jurisdic-
tion and their own regulatory authority.13 In parens patriae actions, a 
state attorney general can sue only on behalf of her state and its citizens. 
State attorneys’ status as public actors who involve only a single state’s 
law allows them to circumvent some of the procedural uncertainties that 
Rule 23 presents.14 But, unless all state attorneys enter the fray—and on-
ly twenty-nine did so in the Toyota sudden-acceleration cases15—they 
cannot fully redress defendant’s past conduct even though they might 
negotiate for broad injunctive relief that affects future conduct uniform-
ly. 
Likewise, in individual suits, most people prefer not to sue and those 
who do may find that their claim is not worth an attorney’s investment.16 
Joinder and multidistrict litigation recalibrate the cost imbalance in part 
 
10 Nancy J. Moore et al., Class Actions Against Toyota Mount as Nationwide, State Suits 
Are Filed, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 147 (Feb. 26, 2010).  
11 Chris Woodyard, Toyota Recall Nightmare Results in Deal with 29 States, USA Today (Feb. 
14, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/02/14/toyota-recalls-attorney-general-
settlement/1919883/. 
12 Douglas & Fletcher, supra note 9. 
13 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the 
U.S. Experience, 34 Tex. Int’l L.J. 135, 137 (1999) (discussing limited jurisdiction). 
14 But some courts have required individual proof, subjecting them to a shadow Rule 23 
standard. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
15 Woodyard, supra note 11. 
16 See Shawn J. Bayern, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1697, 1702 (2005) (using mathematical models and sociological research to support the 
notion that most injured persons do not sue). 
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by pooling claims and placing the onus of funding and developing 
common discovery on the plaintiffs’ steering committee. But when indi-
vidual claims arise from disparate states’ laws and the transferee judge 
has authority over pretrial procedures only, feasibility problems persist. 
The only way to resolve cases collectively is to settle—not adjudicate. 
Multidistrict litigation thus suffers from an additional mismatch between 
transferee judges’ limited decisional authority and the scope of behavior 
they attempt to regulate. 
The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) exacerbated the prism ef-
fect by making putative classes removable, even where state law pro-
vides the decisional rules. When multiple states’ laws apply to a nation-
wide class, transferee judges are at a loss: Certifying a class action 
seems unmanageable, they are not the foremost authority on other states’ 
laws,17 and yet they face tremendous pressure to resolve the litigation.18 
Absent remanding cases to their transferor courts, which transferee 
judges loathe doing, their jurisdictional limits constrain private attor-
neys’ ability to credibly threaten a trial and make multidistrict litigation 
an ill-suited means to regulate nationwide misconduct. 
As multidistrict litigation illustrates, substantive law and remedial re-
lief can further refract the defendant’s uniform behavior. When nation-
wide classes arise out of state law, the class’s scope may mirror the de-
fendant’s conduct, but the choice-of-law problem injects a wrinkle that 
can render classes unmanageable and thus uncertifiable in federal court. 
To be sure, the problem is not with states adopting their own laws, 
which is a central feature of federalism, but in assuming laws’ differ-
ences without examining whether each defines core elements of a de-
fendant’s wrongdoing in similar terms. Put simply, when many states’ 
laws govern, there is no single body of law that is coterminous with de-
fendant’s conduct, but there may be similarities among those laws that 
 
17 In re Activated Carbon-Based Clothing Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 
1193, 1199 (D. Minn. 2012) (“‘[T]he transferor courts, each of which is familiar with the 
state law of their respective jurisdictions, are in a better position to assess’ these claims.” 
(quoting In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me. 
2011))). 
18 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 La. L. Rev. 399, 417 
(2014) (“[T]he Panel views quickly settling a complex case as a hallmark of success that favor-
ably disposes it to reward that judge with a new assignment.”); see also Susan Willett Bird, 
Note, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Court Judges, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 475, 482 
n.42 (1975) (reporting that related cases were “assigned specifically to Judge X . . . because he 
was ‘especially able’”). 
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would allow courts to adjudicate conduct uniformly. Yet, unlike declara-
tory or injunctive relief that targets defendant’s actions, determining 
which plaintiffs are entitled to damages can shift the focus away from 
the defendant’s behavior and toward individual eligibility requirements, 
often dooming Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance analysis.19 So, even 
though a nationwide class action’s regulatory scope theoretically mirrors 
the defendant’s wrongdoing, class actions may fall prey to the prism ef-
fect, too, unless they invoke federal law in federal court. 
B. Exploiting the Mismatch to Fragment Class Actions 
As repeat players, defendants are all too aware of a class action’s en-
forcement power.20 To undermine class certification, they have steadily 
amassed a series of victories that exploit imbalances between power and 
jurisdiction21 and shift attention away from uniform wrongdoing—even 
wrongdoing that receives consistent treatment under federal law—and 
toward diverse plaintiffs.22 For example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 
strengthened the commonality standard under Rule 23(a) and ensured 
that defendants could raise individual defenses, which may inject dispar-
ate issues into an otherwise cohesive class.23 What matters now is not 
whether plaintiffs can raise common questions, but whether “a classwide 
proceeding [can] generate common answers apt to drive the resolution 
of the litigation.”24 After Dukes, defendants have convinced courts to 
scrutinize the plaintiffs’ commonality vis-à-vis one another and have 
 
19 See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)). 
20 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 100 (1974) (“[Repeat players] can play for rules as 
well as immediate gains. First, it pays a[ repeat player]to expend resources in influencing the 
making of the relevant rules by such methods as lobbying.”). 
21 E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 4–5. 
22 E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Now plaintiffs must prove 
Rule 23’s standards by a preponderance of the evidence and district courts must consider the 
merits before certifying a class—at least insofar as the merits overlap with Rule 23’s re-
quirements. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014); 
Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008). 
23 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–54, 2561. 
24 Id. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate 
Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).  
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thereby dodged class certification in toxic-tort cases,25 environmental-
law cases,26 products-liability cases,27 breach-of-contract claims,28 and 
Truth in Lending Act claims to name but a few.29 
This logic, that variances among plaintiffs can undermine certifica-
tion, gained further footing in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.30 Comcast ex-
tended Dukes’s “rigorous analysis” standard from Rule 23(b)(2) classes 
to Rule 23(b)(3) classes and held that plaintiffs’ antitrust damages had to 
be calculable on a class-wide basis.31 Otherwise, divisible remedies 
might overwhelm predominance, rendering the class uncertifiable.32 As 
the dissenters pointed out, before Comcast, courts routinely certified an-
titrust classes with individual-damage calculations; adjudicating ques-
tions about defendants’ antitrust-related conduct uniformly saved sub-
stantial time and expense.33 
Given their luck overcoming class actions in federal courts, defend-
ants hoped to expand CAFA’s removal jurisdiction to state parens pa-
triae actions. When filed in federal courts and consolidated with private 
claims, some federal judges subjected parens patriae litigation to shad-
ow Rule 23 standards and emphasized citizens’ individual proof.34 That 
 
25 Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 03-47775-NZ, slip op. at 2–5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 18, 
2011) (pinion and order denying class certification), available at 2011 WL 3269118. 
26 Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 260–62 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding the district 
court’s refusal to certify CERCLA claims based on contaminated drinking water because 
plaintiffs could not establish commonality). 
27 See, e.g., In re Bisphenol-A (“BPA”) Polycarbonate Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., 276 
F.R.D. 336, 344 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (refusing to certify a class because individualized damage 
inquiries and plaintiffs’ differing knowledge about the BPA controversy undermined com-
monality). 
28 Altier v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, No. 11-241, 2011 WL 3205229, at *13 
(E.D. La. July 26, 2011) (declining to certify claims adjusters’ breach-of-employment 
agreement claims in part because the allegations would require individualized damage de-
terminations). 
29 Haynes v. Planet Automall, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 65, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that ques-
tions concerning whether fees and warranties were part of TILA’s finance charge could not 
“be answered uniformly on a class-wide basis”). 
30 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Recognition that individual damages calculations 
do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”). 
34 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (rea-
soning that state claims stand “on the foundation of many thousands of conceptually separate 
claims”). Judge Fallon’s reasoning in the Vioxx litigation likewise required individualized 
proof, noting that the prescribing decision in each doctor-patient relationship differed and 
that a state would have to prove that each doctor would not have prescribed the drug but for 
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prompted defendants to claim that state suits were simply class actions 
in disguise and therefore removable under CAFA. But the Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. 
clarified that CAFA’s text, which requires class allegations or one hun-
dred or more plaintiffs suing jointly,35 does not cover parens patriae 
claims involving only a single plaintiff: the state.36 While this decision 
constitutes a limited victory for states’ attorneys, it can also hinder for-
mal coordination among regulators. 
As class actions fragment, so too does enforcement. When regulators 
have overlapping authority and their power is not coterminous with the 
impact of a defendant’s behavior, multiple regulators will sue in differ-
ent fora to police the same misconduct. Coordination is ad hoc, at best. 
Despite some efforts by states’ attorneys to create multistate groups,37 
partner with federal agencies,38 or hire private plaintiffs’ attorneys to as-
sist them with parens patriae cases,39 a single question persists: Are 
these efforts enough to overcome the prism effect and fill enforcement 
gaps? 
Even though newsworthy events can entice attorneys general to sue, 
for better or worse, private attorneys remain the principal means for en-
forcing run-of-the-mill substantive rights in areas like employment dis-
crimination, securities fraud, products liability, consumer fraud, anti-
trust, and civil rights. But, as courts focus on dissimilarities among 
plaintiffs and certify fewer class actions, plaintiffs’ attorneys are less 
 
Merck’s actions. M. Gabrielle Hils, Defending Against the Onslaught of State Attorneys 
General Actions Against Drug Manufacturers: Lessons Learned from Recent Cases, in Navi-
gating Drug and Medical Device Legal Issues Leading Lawyers on Handling, Trademark, 
Fraud, and Liability Concerns (2014), available at 2014 WL 2355616, at *12–13. 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012). 
36 134 S. Ct. 736, 743 (2014). 
37 Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General 
in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 2003–04 (2001). 
38 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys Gen-
eral Reach Nearly $1 Billion Agreement with SunTrust to Address Mortgage Loan Origination 
As Well As Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (June 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2014/June/14-civ-638.html. 
39 See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (listing 
private attorney, Jonathan S. Massey, as representing the State of Mississippi); Donald G. 
Gifford & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court, CAFA, and Parens Patriae Actions: 
Will It Be Principles or Biases?, 92 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 1, 3 (2013) (“A parens patriae 
action is filed by the state attorney general, but often with the assistance of private plaintiffs’ 
counsel specializing in mass tort actions.”). 
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likely to invest their time and resources.40 Without some change, en-
forcement gaps may persist and defendants will have no formal means to 
prevent seriatim litigation, even after winning several cases. 
C. Fallout from the Prism Effect 
Whether this regulatory magnetism is optimal in terms of compensa-
tion and deterrence is a hotly debated normative and empirical ques-
tion.41 Yet, one need not wade too far into the substantive debate to ap-
preciate the descriptive point that regulatory layers exist and those layers 
affect aggregation’s procedural goals. Aggregation should not only ena-
ble regulators to enforce substantive rights, but encourage efficient re-
source use, generate binding resolutions, and produce accurate results 
through trial and settlement.42 Accordingly, of interest here is how pro-
cedural goals are affected by the shift away from plenary class certifica-
tion and the potential for serial relitigation of common questions. 
1. Settlement-Oriented Litigation 
Increasingly strict certification standards have prompted plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to adopt two principal strategies: winnow the constellation of 
 
40 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1273, 1283–91 (2012). 
41 See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statuto-
ry Discontinuities, 29 Va. Envtl. L.J. 237, 286–300 (2011) (claiming that regulatory overlap 
is an efficient way to ensure against regulatory gaps); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regula-
tion, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 891–92 (2006) (suggesting that regulatory overlap encourages 
innovation and overcomes inertia); Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial 
Regulation, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 537, 539 (2012) (suggesting that regulatory overlap be-
tween public and private regulators makes agency capture more difficult); Elizabeth Cham-
blee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 63, 
88–89 (2008) (arguing that securities class actions provide a public good and that integrating 
public and private suits diminishes collective action problems, and agency inaction); William 
W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons; A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2003) (expressing concern about under-regulation as a result of agencies 
with overlapping jurisdiction); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1138–51 (2012) (arguing that overlapping agen-
cy jurisdiction can generate efficiency gains if coordinated); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, 
Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative 
State, 91 Geo. L.J. 757, 759–80 (2003) (highlighting problems with over-regulation). For an 
excellent overview of the regulatory and adjectival conceptions of Rule 23, see David Mar-
cus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 587, 592–98 (2013). 
42 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 1.03 (2010). 
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claims they seek to certify as a class, and “litigate” with an all-
encompassing aim toward settlement—whether as a settlement class ac-
tion or an aggregate settlement through multidistrict litigation.43 
The trend toward leaving claims on the table itself has taken at least 
two forms.44 First, in employment-discrimination cases, plaintiffs’ attor-
neys have carved divisible, monetary remedies out of the class action 
and requested that courts certify indivisible remedies, like declaratory 
and injunctive relief, under Rule 23(b)(2).45 Strategically, this not only 
extricates the individualized questions that accompany divisible relief, 
but it means that plaintiffs do not automatically receive notice or opt-out 
rights, and that common questions need not predominate over individual 
ones. 
Second, where defective products like cars cause both personal inju-
ries and economic damages, attorneys sever personal-injury claims 
through their class definition and complaint.46 This extracts individual-
ized factual inquiries concerning things like driver error and road condi-
tions from the predominance question while expanding the number of 
class members. After all, more people will have suffered economic inju-
ry from a recalled or defective car’s diminished value than will experi-
ence personal injuries. But because economic damages are typically 
founded in consumer-protection and breach-of-warranty claims, attor-
neys must convince courts that states’ laws are functionally equivalent 
lest the choice-of-law question swamp Rule 23(b)(3)’s manageability 
inquiry.47 
 
43 Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist 
Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2245, 2288–89 
(2008) (discussing settlement bias in multidistrict litigation). 
44 Before CAFA, the trend was to forgo federal claims so as to avoid removal under feder-
al question jurisdiction. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 
105 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 748–49 (2005) (“The decision to disclaim any federal grounds for 
relief can, of course, have a real impact on a plaintiff’s prospects for recovery.”).  
45 Plaintiffs have begun requesting issue class certification as to the Rule 23(b)(2) claims. 
See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 
2012) (certifying an issue class, noting that some pecuniary relief might be suitable for class 
treatment, and suggesting that even if not because Merrill Lynch’s brokers earn at least 
$100,000 a year, individual claims would be worthwhile to pursue). 
46 See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting plain-
tiffs’ request for economic damages, disgorgement, interest, and punitive damages stemming 
from an air bag recall). 
47 See, e.g., id. at 725 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the laws of the fifty-one jurisdic-
tions are “virtually the same”); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., 
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (denying 
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Of course, manageability is a problem only if the class is certified for 
trial.48 Hence the rise of so-called “settlement class actions,” classes that 
courts certify for settlement purposes only.49 But settlement classes tip 
the balance of power even further in defendants’ favor: Without plenary 
class certification, plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot credibly threaten trial and 
dissatisfied defendants can simply negotiate with other plaintiffs’ law-
yers who would welcome settlement and the attorneys’ fees that accom-
pany it.50 Settlement classes likewise mean that the court will never fully 
hear or adjudicate the dispute’s merits.51 These combined circumstances 
create a substantial risk that settlement classes will undervalue class 
members’ claims.52 
Nonclass aggregate settlements fare no better. Removing class certifi-
cation from the equation forces judges into murky territory; the same 
principal-agent problems that Rule 23 confronts persist, but judges lack 
clear policing authority.53 When a judge certifies a class, Rule 23 be-
stows the power to appoint class counsel, ensure a fair settlement, and 
award fees, all of which help prevent counsel from exploiting absent 
 
plaintiffs’ request to apply California law as a precursor to a motion to certify a nationwide 
class). 
48 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Confronted with a request 
for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if 
tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no 
trial.”). 
49 See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2013 
WL 499474, at *11 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2013) (certifying settlement class actions); In re Oil 
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 295 F.R.D. 112, 147 (E.D. 
La. 2013) (certifying medical benefits settlement class action); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Un-
intended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS 
(FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (provisionally certifying a na-
tional settlement class for economic loss cases); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater 
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 931 (E.D. La. 2012) (certifying econom-
ic benefits settlement class action).  
50 Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
951, 953 (2014); see also Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 
F.3d 913, 918 (2011) (“[W]e and other courts have often remarked the incentive of class 
counsel, in complicity with the defendant’s counsel, to sell out the class . . . .”). 
51 Erichson, supra note 50, at 953. Courts consider the merits only insofar as they overlap 
with the certification requirements. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 
S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013). 
52 Erichson, supra note 50, at 953. 
53 As I have argued elsewhere, if judges awarded lead lawyers attorneys’ fees on a quan-
tum-meruit theory, that would give judges a valid private law basis for monitoring settle-
ments. Burch, supra note 1. 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2015] Constructing Issue Classes 1869 
class members.54 But absent certification, the law treats aggregate set-
tlements the same as other private settlements: Judges have no formal 
authority.55 
Without standards and formal supervision, recent nonclass settlements 
garnered through multidistrict litigation have suffered from self-dealing 
provisions. Lead lawyers abuse their negotiating position by increasing 
their attorneys’ fees via settlement (presumably by exchanging something 
of value like lower settlement amounts or higher participation thresh-
olds),56 or inserting provisions that force participating attorneys to recom-
mend that all their clients accept the settlement offer and withdraw from 
representing those who refuse.57 So, although clients are not absent as they 
are in class actions,58 their coerced “consent” to these settlements does not 
legitimize the deal as it might in truly individual litigation.59 Granted, certi-
fied class actions are not perfect either; their merits have been debated ex-
tensively.60 But a certified class—even a certified issue class—has judicial 
 
54 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g), (h), advisory committee’s notes. 
55 Some judges have attempted to informally approve or disapprove nonclass settlements. 
E.g., Transcript of Status Conference, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 4, 30, 
36 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/vioxx/Transcripts/11-9-
07.pdf (convening judges with heavy Vioxx dockets to jointly announce and informally “ap-
prove” the settlement alongside lead lawyers). For commentary on this trend, see Burch, su-
pra note 1, at 85, 116–17 n.236; Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class 
Settlements, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1015, 1024 (2013) (“Claims belong to claimants, not to the 
judge.”). 
56 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (E.D. La. 2008) (al-
lowing lead lawyers to contract around the initial three-percent fee cap through the settle-
ment agreement, but reducing the contractual eight percent to six-and-a-half percent); In re 
Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 
682174, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (permitting the lead attorneys to “contract around” 
the judge’s initial order on fees and increasing their fees substantially—from 2 to 14.4 per-
cent, or by an extra $29.7 million). For more information, see Burch, supra note 1, at 80–81; 
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-
District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 107, 109 (2010). 
57 Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.2.8, In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-01657, (E.D. 
La. Nov. 9, 2007) (initial settlement agreement) (on file with the author). For the many ways 
in which this agreement arguably ran afoul of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see 
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 
265, 280–92 (2011). 
58 Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The control of the class over 
its lawyers usually is attenuated, often to the point of nonexistence.”). 
59 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 506, 512–14 (2011); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 57, at 274–92. 
60 See, e.g., Eubank, 753 F.3d at 719 (noting that the class is “a worthwhile supplement to 
conventional litigation procedure” but that it is controversial “because it is frequently 
abused”). 
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quality-control measures and adequate representation checks that so-
called “quasi class actions” lack.61 
2. Unpredictable Preclusion 
As one might expect, when attorneys leave claims on the table or opt 
for a settlement class action to leverage bargaining authority that does 
not exist, dissatisfied plaintiffs will sue again.62 When plaintiffs initiate 
subsequent suits, they seek to avoid preclusion by claiming the repre-
sentative inadequately represented them in the first suit. Multiple regula-
tors escalate preclusion concerns. Defendants may hope to thwart con-
tinued litigation on a particular issue, private citizens might want to 
recover compensation in the wake of a parens patriae action, or a state 
attorney might wish to free ride on private counsel’s efforts. 
Assessing adequate representation in the preclusion context is com-
plicated when public regulators’ aims diverge from private claimants’ 
goals. For instance, public officials might exchange a rapid settlement 
with splashy headlines for insubstantial contributions to victims, suc-
cumb to regulatory capture, distribute awards (if any) inequitably, or use 
quick settlements to cover up regulatory missteps.63 And though parens 
patriae cases protect the public interest,64 they lack Rule 23’s certifica-
tion procedures, including the adequacy requirement.65 Thus, when 
parens patriae actions conclude first, no court has tested for intra-group 
conflicts or conflicts between the state attorney and the citizens.66 
 
61 Burch, supra note 1, at 74, 112.  
62 As the majority in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes observed, this “creates perverse in-
centives for class representatives to place at risk potentially valid claims for monetary relief” 
and “also create[s] the possibility . . . that individual class members’ compensatory-damages 
claims would be precluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart from.” 
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (emphasis omitted).  
63 Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 486, 498 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, The Correc-
tive Justice State, 5 J. Tort L. 189, 217 (2014); Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue 
Attorneys General, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2014, at A1. 
64 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (holding that a state 
“must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State 
must be more than a nominal party” and must “express a quasi-sovereign interest”).  
65 Lemos, supra note 63, at 503. Some states have built adequacy requirements into their 
statutory authority for prosecuting actions under parens patriae. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012) (barring subsequent citizen suits only if the “Administrator or State 
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting” an enforcement action).  
66 See infra Subsection III.C.3 for a proposed solution to this problem. 
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Inadequate representation concerns were less prominent in traditional 
parens patriae cases involving truly aggregate rights. When the state 
sued to vindicate its citizens’ public interest in water, wildlife manage-
ment, or public transit,67 preclusion was straightforward: The resulting 
judgment bound both the state and its citizens since the injury affected 
the public as a whole.68 But as defendants have exploited jurisdictional 
imbalances and substantive and procedural limitations to their ad-
vantage, state attorneys have waded into murkier territory involving 
nonstatutory, “quasi-sovereign” claims.69 Departing from well-traveled 
paths makes adequate representation and preclusion far less certain; 
questions persist about whether consumers can “double dip,” and, if so, 
how a defendant can ever achieve finality.70 
II. RECONSTITUTING CONDUCT BY RECONSIDERING COHESION 
The crux of preclusion and adequate representation often hinges on 
whether a class is cohesive, a term that lacks a clear definition despite its 
central importance. Debuting in the 1966 Rules Advisory Committee’s 
 
67 Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 506–07, 509 (1932) (water rights); Berman v. 
Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1952) (public transit); Alaska Legisla-
tive Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d 181 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (wildlife management). 
68 Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. at 506–07, 509. 
69 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 2, at 661–68 (urging the greater use of parens patriae 
authority); Lemos, supra note 63, at 498 (raising inadequate representation issues). The Su-
preme Court has been enigmatic in defining the parameters of “quasi-sovereign” interests. 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601; 13B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3531.11 (3d ed. 2008). As one commentator observed, “‘Quasi-
sovereign’ is one of those loopy concepts that comes along often enough to remind us that 
appellate courts sometimes lose their moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a meaningless 
term absolutely bereft of utility.” Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 
1847, 1851 (2000). 
70 Compare In re Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 
05-md-1712, 2013 WL 3463503, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (granting in part defendants’ 
motion to enjoin the Pennsylvania Attorney General from seeking restitution—but not other 
forms of relief—in a civil enforcement proceeding after private plaintiffs entered into a class 
action settlement), with Spinelli v. Capital One Bank, USA, No. 8:08-CV-132-T-33EAJ, 
2012 WL 3609028, at *1, *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2012) (declining to enjoin Mississippi and 
Hawaii attorneys general from civil enforcement after a class action settlement and noting 
that “the government is not bound by private litigation when the government’s action seeks 
to enforce a[ ] statute that implicates both public and private interests”), and CFTC v. Com-
mercial Hedge Servs., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (D. Neb. 2006) (refusing to enjoin a 
federal administrative agency from seeking restitution for private settlement-class members 
because it was a public agency and therefore not bound by a private agreement).  
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discussion, reporter Benjamin Kaplan suggested that notice and opt-out 
rights in Rule 23(b)(3) could solve problems of weak intra-class unity.71 
But the Supreme Court’s subsequent approach to class cohesion has 
been inconsistent at best. In Amchem Products v. Windsor, the Court 
identified cohesion as part of the predominance inquiry under Rule 
23(b)(3),72 but a year later, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., it suggested 
that cohesion was ensconced in Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which does not re-
quire predominance.73 Then, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, the Court ap-
peared to locate cohesion within Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality by requir-
ing “some glue” holding employment decisions together.74 
So, while Rule 23’s text makes no mention of class cohesion, the 
Court has imported homogeneity concerns into no less than three parts 
of the Rule—but has not once defined what cohesion means. A close 
reading of those opinions indicates that the term must refer to a class’s 
internal unity, which qualifies a class to litigate as a single unit.75 What’s 
lacking, however, is any explanation of what counts as class unity, how 
much is required, and why it matters. As I and others have theorized 
elsewhere, cohesion and commonality are not synonymous, cohesion 
cannot simply be a metric for justifying certification on judicial econo-
my grounds, and cohesion likely serves to mitigate dignity and legitima-
cy concerns about undermining one’s day in court through representa-
tive litigation.76 
 
71 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 391–94 (1967). 
72 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 
S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013) (“[P]roof of materiality is not required to establish that a proposed 
class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation’—the focus of the 
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
73 527 U.S. 815, 858 (1999) (“[T]he determination whether ‘proposed classes are suffi-
ciently cohesive to warrant adjudication’ must focus on ‘questions that preexist any settle-
ment.’”). 
74 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).  
75 Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 651, 
673–701 (2014). 
76 Id.; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193, 265–69 (1992); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, 
and the Line Between, 58 Kan. L. Rev. 889, 894–99 (2010); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Cal-
ibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure Versus Procedural Justice, DePaul L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 9–11, 14–18, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617355). As one can surmise from these different approaches, Pro-
fessor Bone and I agree on a process-oriented view, but differ as to how that might play out, 
particularly given my communitarian and procedural justice bent. 
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Not surprisingly, lower courts and litigants have invoked cohesion 
haphazardly, using a smattering of metrics to measure it. Courts have, 
for example, seized upon class members’ physical characteristics to pre-
sume cohesion,77 but being the same race or gender does not make a 
group cohesive or its members’ interests uniform.78 For instance, in de-
segregation and school busing cases, some class members wanted to im-
prove local black schools instead of integrating, while others wanted to 
avoid busing their children to integrated but violent schools.79 Neverthe-
less, they were lumped into the same class of African Americans seeking 
integration and busing. The same is true in both Title IX education and 
Title VII employment-discrimination cases: There are female students 
who are happy with the status quo and employees who prefer not to sue 
at all.80 But they are presumed cohesive and included within the class. 
Even in securities classes where race and gender are not at issue, courts 
implement multifactor tests to gauge whether lead plaintiffs are cohe-
sive—all the while overlooking the need for lead plaintiffs to represent 
class members’ diverse interests.81 Each of these artificial proxies leads 
courts astray from what truly connects the plaintiffs: the defendant’s 
conduct towards them and plaintiffs’ shared interest in holding the de-
fendant accountable.82 
 
77 See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (positing 
that the Rule 23(b)(2) “class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogeneous and cohe-
sive group with few conflicting interests among its members”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 87, 110 (2011). 
78 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 
3043, 3047–48 (2013). 
79 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 471–72 (1976); Leo Crowley, Due Pro-
cess Rights of Absentees in Title VII Class Actions—The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 
59 B.U. L. Rev. 661, 666–80 (1979) (arguing that the divergent interests in Title VII cases 
cause inadequate representation). 
80 See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 192 F.R.D. 568, 574 (W.D. 
Mich. 1999) (recognizing the possibility “that members of the class have no desire to pursue 
this action, and are not unhappy with the status quo”). 
81 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1109, 1111, 1141–
42, 1151–55 (2011); e.g., Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (using the following test to evaluate cohesion: “(1) the existence of a pre-
litigation relationship between group members; (2) involvement of the group members in the 
litigation thus far; (3) plans for cooperation; (4) the sophistication of its members; and (5) 
whether the members chose outside counsel, and not vice versa”). 
82 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The [majority’s] ‘dissimi-
larities’ approach leads the Court to train its attention on what distinguishes individual class 
members, rather than on what unites them. . . .”). 
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To be sure, claimants may have genuine bonds or social connections 
that pre-date the litigation, such as labor unions in the asbestos litigation, 
support groups in the tainted blood products litigation, veterans’ groups 
in the Agent Orange litigation, or citizens committees in the Buffalo 
Creek disaster.83 And, with the advent of the Internet and social media, 
even geographically dispersed litigants might associate with one another 
after filing suit, form groups, and effectively govern themselves.84 So, 
while it is possible for cohesive groups to pre-date or post-date the law-
suit, that does not change what unified plaintiffs for adjudication pur-
poses: a defendant’s actions.85 
Identifying a defendant’s alleged conduct as what often bonds plain-
tiffs reorients traditional thinking about class cohesion and frees courts 
to think pragmatically about how to situate, sort, and adjudicate the par-
ticular components of any claim.86 Classifying claims and defenses into 
their constituent parts and goals—to either regulate a defendant’s con-
duct or determine a plaintiff’s eligibility for relief—serves two purposes. 
First, it illuminates how aggregate proof can interact with substantive 
law to establish a defendant’s common conduct or mask individual dif-
ferences in proving plaintiffs’ eligibility components. Second, it sets the 
stage for courts to use issue classes to adjudicate components relating to 
a defendant’s uniform conduct as well as plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief 
when it can be satisfied with aggregate proof. 
A. Defendant’s Conduct Components Versus Plaintiff’s  
Eligibility Components 
Recasting the elements of a claim or defense into conduct components 
and eligibility components can facilitate sensible and procedurally legit-
imate outcomes.87 In most situations, the term “component” will be in-
 
83 Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private 
Gain 298 (2000) (describing the hemophiliac community’s HIV litigation); Elizabeth Cham-
blee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (2009). 
84 Burch, supra note 77, at 119–21 (citing examples). 
85 Actual cohesion may justify imposing moral or legal obligations on group members. 
Burch, supra note 83, at 17–20. 
86 I have elaborated on the day-in-court participation aspects of this proposal elsewhere. 
Burch, Calibrating Participation, supra note 76, at 18–22. 
87 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Ac-
tion, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1439–40 (1995) (“[T]he class action would resolve only the 
issues of liability and generic causation. Each plaintiff would still be required to prove in a 
separate trial the facts demonstrating individual causation in that plaintiff’s case (for exam-
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terchangeable with what we consider a legal element. But evaluating a 
design defect under a risk-utility standard, for instance, commingles a 
defendant’s conduct in creating a product with how consumers interact 
with it. Thus, “component” is a more precise locution devised to reflect 
the occasional circumstance in which a single legal element cannot be 
classified holistically. 
“Conduct components” concern the defendant’s conduct: what a de-
fendant knew, when the defendant knew it, whether a defendant used bi-
ased hiring procedures, what changes a corporation made to a product, 
or how a corporation labeled and advertised a product. In tort law, gen-
eral causation might classify as a conduct component because it tests 
whether a defendant’s product is capable of causing the harm alleged. 
When a defendant’s actions are uniform and nonindividuated, conduct 
components are common to all people affected by those actions and are 
thus theoretically ripe for aggregate treatment.88 Put differently, adding 
or subtracting a particular plaintiff when adjudicating a defendant’s con-
 
ple, that the plaintiff was occupationally exposed to asbestos for a sufficient period to cause 
the claimed injury or illness).”); cf. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 
42, § 2.01 cmt. c (characterizing common issues as arising with respect to “upstream” mat-
ters and individual issues cropping up in “downstream” matters “centered upon the individu-
al situations of those claimants themselves”).  
88 See, e.g., In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 
2014) (noting that liability issues related to defendant’s conduct were “suited to class-wide 
resolution”); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 804, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting 
“the district court set forth a considerable list of issues that were common to all the class 
members’ claims. Nearly all of these issues related to either the complicated factual ques-
tions surrounding BP’s involvement in the well design, explosion, discharge of oil, and 
cleanup efforts” and that those issues were certifiable despite “the particular need in such 
cases for individualized damages calculations”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 
F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding certification based on defendant’s military-
contractor defense); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Prac-
tices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS (FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (“The class members’ claims all arise from allegations regarding a 
common defect. Moreover, the class members’ claims derive from similar or identical war-
ranties and are based on common advertisements and representations regarding their vehi-
cles.”); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[A]s to the vit-
amin product class, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants have participated in a unitary 
overarching conspiracy which encompassed a number of identified vitamins.”); Jenkins v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 279–80 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (certifying a class action 
based on defendant’s state-of-the-art defense); see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and 
Due Process, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1059, 1068–69 (2012); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class 
Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393, 428–29 
(2000). 
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duct should have no effect on the proceedings because conduct compo-
nents have nothing to do with the plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief.89 
When private plaintiffs sue, they must also demonstrate certain indi-
viduated “eligibility components” entitling them to the relief they re-
quest. Some eligibility components like reliance, specific causation 
(proximate cause), and damages fall upon plaintiffs to prove because 
they are part and parcel of the claim itself. Other eligibility components 
concern affirmative defenses and require that defendants prove them—
statute of limitations or assumption of the risk, for example.90 Because 
these elements define which plaintiffs were legally harmed by a defend-
ant’s conduct and by how much, they are more individuated than con-
duct components. Nevertheless, certain substantive doctrines have elim-
inated this variability. The fraud-on-the-market doctrine in securities 
class actions provides an apt example. Without it, each purchaser would 
have to prove that she relied on a company’s misstatements, thereby de-
feating the possibility of a securities class action; with it, the fraud is in-
corporated into the efficient market’s price and those who traded during 
a particular period satisfy reliance by relying on the market’s integrity.91 
Requests for remedial relief can be classified along similar lines. Di-
visible remedies, such as compensatory damages, tend to be plaintiff-
specific and flow from establishing eligibility components.92 Indivisible 
remedies, on the other hand, such as injunctive or declaratory relief, 
yield uniform results to claimants because they relate to the defendant’s 
conduct, not—as some courts and commentators have maintained—
because class members themselves share cohesive physical traits.93 
 
89 See Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If there are 
genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the accu-
racy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it 
makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issue in one fell swoop 
while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issue to individual follow-on proceedings.”). 
90 Granted, if the statute of limitations issue turns on intentional concealment or wrongdo-
ing by the defendant then it could be a conduct component. 
91 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014); Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
92 See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.04(a) (“Divisible 
remedies are those that entail the distribution of relief to one or more claimants individually, 
without determining in practical effect the application or availability of the same remedy to 
any other claimant.”). 
93 This is slightly different from the view espoused by the Principles of the Law of Aggre-
gate Litigation. Section 2.04 helpfully distinguishes between divisible and indivisible reme-
dies, but defines what is and is not divisible based on the claimant’s relationship to the rem-
edy. Id. § 2.04(a), (b) (“Indivisible remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to 
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Granted, there is an eligibility component to indivisible remedies: A 
court must be able to identify the class of people entitled to enforce the 
declaratory or injunctive relief and must likewise be able to preclude 
that group from relitigating the same questions. While those determina-
tions require the certifying court to be precise in defining the class,94 
they should not affect the certification inquiry itself. 
To illustrate the basic conduct versus eligibility classification process, 
consider a few substantive examples from securities, consumer protec-
tion, and employment cases.95 Proving securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 
requires plaintiffs to introduce evidence of three conduct-related compo-
nents: defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission;96 defendant’s 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud (scienter);97 and a connection 
between defendant’s material misconduct and a securities transaction.98 
But to make a prima facie case of securities fraud, private plaintiffs must 
also prove eligibility components, including a connection between their 
purchase or sale and the defendant’s misconduct, their reliance on the 
misconduct, and both economic and loss causation, which demonstrate a 
causal relationship between the material misrepresentation and the plain-
tiff’s loss.99 
The conduct components in proving a breach of warranty claim in-
volving an allegedly defective product can be classified similarly: Prov-
ing that a defendant issued and breached a warranty—so long as the is-
suance was standardized across the product in question—might be done 
 
any claimant as a practical matter determines the application or availability of the same rem-
edy to other claimants.”). 
94 See infra Subsection III.A.3 (discussing ascertainability). 
95 Many of these examples are federal theories where the conduct component is relatively 
uniform throughout the country. State laws may differ in ways that emphasize different evi-
dence. Thus, one must consider whether an issue class using states’ laws will materially ad-
vance the claims’ resolution and whether choice-of-law problems can be overcome by, for 
instance delineating two or three issue classes that take variations into account. These con-
cerns are addressed in more detail in Subsections III.A.1 and III.A.2 respectively. 
96 Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); Levinson, 485 U.S. at 231–32. 
97 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007); Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015); Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities 
Regulation § 12.5, at 481–83 (rev. 5th ed. 2014); e.g., Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d 
638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
99 Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341–42; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in 
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 Md. L. Rev. 348, 350–51 (2007). 
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uniformly.100 Eligibility components vary by state, but often include 
proving loss or injury to the plaintiff-buyer and a causal connection be-
tween the breach of warranty and the plaintiff’s loss.101 So, if plaintiffs 
alleged that a defendant’s design modifications to a washing machine 
caused it to accumulate mold and thereby violated the defendant’s war-
ranty,102 or if a defendant asserted that its product met industry stand-
ards,103 those allegations concern common conduct components.104 
Title VII employment-discrimination cases illustrate the fallacy of let-
ting eligibility components doom class treatment of conduct-related 
components. Plaintiffs must principally prove that a defendant’s conduct 
disparately impacted a protected class by pointing to something like a 
company-wide policy,105 a common practice, or a single manager who 
made personnel decisions.106 But courts have used faulty reasoning to 
disintegrate this uniformity. In Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the 
 
100 See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 
838, 853 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that in Ohio, “plaintiffs must prove that (1) a defect existed 
in the product manufactured and sold by the defendant; (2) the defect existed at the time the 
product left the defendant’s hands; and (3) the defect directly and proximately caused the 
plaintiff’s injury or loss”); Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1424 (4th Cir. 
1985) (interpreting Maryland law to require proof of the warranty, breach of that warranty, 
and harm proximately caused by the breach); Nieberding v. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc., 
302 F.R.D. 600, 618 (D. Kan. 2014) (“Here there is essentially one central, common issue of 
liability: whether the plastic brackets designed by Barrette and sold by Home Depot were 
defective.”); Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 354 S.E.2d 495, 497 (N.C. 1987) (interpret-
ing North Carolina law to require plaintiff to prove that there was a warranty, the goods did 
not comply with the warranty, the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defective goods, and 
that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result). 
101 Klein, 773 F.2d at 1424; Morrison, 354 S.E.2d at 497. 
102 See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The 
basic question presented by the mold claim—are the machines defective in permitting mold 
to accumulate and generate noxious odors?—is common to the entire mold class, although 
damages are likely to vary across class members (the owners of the washing machines).”); In 
re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 846 (“The plaintiffs’ causes of action rest on the central al-
legation that all of the Duets share a common design defect—the machines fail to clean 
properly their own mechanical components to eliminate soil and residue deposits known as 
‘biofilm.’”). 
103 In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2014). 
104 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at  2551. 
105 E.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489–
90 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing the denial of class certification as to defendant’s teaming and 
account distribution policies). 
106 See, e.g., Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2004) (find-
ing that the district court erred by not certifying a class of black employees who complained 
that the plant’s top supervisors told them nothing would be done in response to pervasive 
hostility and harassment). 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit claimed that: “The underly-
ing premise of the (b)(2) class—that its members suffer from a common 
injury properly addressed by classwide relief—‘begins to break down 
when the class seeks to recover back pay or other forms of monetary re-
lief.’”107 A defendant’s conduct toward a protected group is no less 
common when that group seeks divisible remedies. Nor does the request 
for monetary relief change the basic calculus of whether litigating plain-
tiffs’ allegations as to a defendant’s conduct will “resolve an issue that is 
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”108 Rather, 
the trouble comes in litigating conduct and eligibility components in a 
single, class-wide proceeding. 
Title VII cases have also suffered from remedial requests that do not 
fall neatly into a divisible or indivisible category. Punitive damages pun-
ish a defendant’s pattern of discriminatory behavior toward certain em-
ployees and hinge on whether plaintiffs can establish the wrongfulness 
of a defendant’s conduct toward the class as a whole.109 Yet recent Su-
preme Court cases on punitive damages and Title VII seem to tie puni-
tive damages to eligibility components.110 Each employee is eligible for 
up to $300,000 in punitive damages, but must demonstrate that the em-
ployer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination “with malice or 
 
107 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 95 
(D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
108 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
109 See, e.g., Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 438 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(focusing on defendant’s conduct as opposed to the class members’ individualized harms); 
Barefield v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., No. C 86-2427TEH, 1988 WL 188433, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 6, 1988) (“A class claim for punitive damages does not detract from the homogeneity 
or cohesiveness of the class. Rather, it is consistent with the notion that the focus of a (b)(2) 
action is the defendant’s conduct toward persons sharing a common characteristic. Because 
the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the victim, but to punish and deter the 
defendant, any claim for such damages hinges, not on facts unique to each class member, but 
on the defendant’s conduct toward the class as a whole.”); cf Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 
F.3d at 417 (refusing to decide whether punitive damages are available on a class-wide ba-
sis). 
110 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), Phillip Morris 
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 
(2008), can each be read to suggest that punitive damages remedy individual injuries. The 
upshot of Williams is that punitive-damage awards can punish the defendant’s wrongdoing 
only as to a particular plaintiff, not as to those similarly situated. 549 U.S. at 353–54. Exxon 
Shipping Co. and State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance both indicate that punitive-damage 
awards must be tethered to compensatory damages (or, at the very least, backpay). Exxon, 
554 U.S. at 514; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The 
Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 845, 849 (2010). 
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with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an ag-
grieved individual.”111 Thus, some have argued that plaintiffs must 
demonstrate individual injuries to receive punitive damages.112 
Punitive damages straddle the conceptual line between conduct and 
eligibility in tort law as well; classifying them often entails examining 
the underlying substantive doctrine. For example, states have reached 
conflicting outcomes on punitive damages in tobacco cases. In Califor-
nia, an individual’s punitive-damage claim arises out of her own person-
al and emotional injuries, and thus qualifies as an eligibility compo-
nent.113 But in New York, punitive damages are firmly tethered to the 
defendant’s conduct: they aim to deter wrongful conduct, punish misbe-
havior for the public good, and benefit the general public—not private 
parties.114 Plaintiffs must demonstrate “grave misconduct affecting the 
public generally” as opposed to an “individually sustained wrong.”115 
Thus, punitive damages are conduct components that could be adjudi-
cated collectively. 
Harder cases like medical monitoring can likewise benefit from this 
conduct versus eligibility classification. Medical monitoring varies from 
state to state, but the heart of the claim goes to defendant’s conduct: A 
defendant has put people in peril by exposing them to a harmful sub-
stance and therefore has an obligation to minimize future risk of injury 
by covering medical-monitoring costs. Medical monitoring is thus akin 
to other affirmative tort duties. If a driver runs someone off the road at 
night but does not injure her, yet drives off instead of shining his head-
lights in her direction, the driver is liable if the victim subsequently falls 
off a cliff.116 The driver’s failure to shine his headlights is a conduct 
component, whereas the victim’s proof of subsequent injury is an eligi-
 
111 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), (b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
112 E.g., Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d at 417 (noting that the plain language of the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1991 could be interpreted this way, but declining to reach the question). 
113 Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
114 Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); Fabiano v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 54 A.D.3d 146, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Grill v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 481, 498 (S.D.N.Y 2009); Shea v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 73 A.D.3d 730, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
115 Fabiano, 54 A.D.3d at 150; see also Grill, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 498; Shea, 73 A.D.3d at 
732. Some states even require a percentage of punitive damages to be paid into the state’s 
treasury. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2015) (requiring 75% of punitive dam-
ages awarded to be paid into the State treasury). 
116 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1625, 
1710 (2002). 
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bility component. Similarly, in medical monitoring the defendant’s be-
havior in creating and exposing plaintiffs to a hazardous substance is “a 
primary duty of conduct,”117 not “a secondary duty to compensate,”118 
which would be an eligibility component. 
B. Aggregate Proof 
Identifying and labeling the parts in any claim or defense as either 
conduct or eligibility components properly reorients, in the abstract, the 
notion of collectively determining whether the defendant’s conduct was 
wrongful, even if that conduct affects plaintiffs differently. Courts are 
more likely to certify a class when plaintiffs offer proof (or a disputed 
legal question) that applies to all of them equally.119 But moving from 
the abstract to the specific raises questions about how plaintiffs prove 
the defendant’s conduct—whether through aggregate, “top-down” proof 
about the defendant’s act or acts, or individual, “bottom-up” proof that 
reveals the defendant’s true colors only by demonstrating how the de-
fendant treated similarly situated individuals. It also raises questions 
about the legitimacy of de-emphasizing variances among eligibility 
components through statistical proof. 
To smooth over differences in individual proof, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have employed two principal strategies. First, they have argued that the 
underlying substantive doctrine facilitates aggregate treatment by, for 
example, bootstrapping disparate state law claims into a uniform federal 
cause of action.120 Second, they have deployed statistical models to 
transform individual “bottom-up” proof of the defendant’s conduct or 
classic eligibility components like damages into something that appears 
common. As such, decentralized wrongs might seem uniform and plain-
tiffs could dispense with individual proof.121 
 
117 Id.  
118 Id. at 1710–11. 
119 This discussion of conduct versus eligibility components does not explicitly address 
disputed legal questions that might apply to all plaintiffs or all defendants, such as whether a 
market-share theory of liability might apply to asbestos cases or whether the statute of limi-
tations should be extended because of the defendant’s intentional concealment. But the 
omission is not meant to exclude legal questions from consideration, particularly if resolving 
them en masse would materially advance the claims’ resolution as Subsection III.A.1 de-
scribes.  
120 See infra notes 122–30. 
121 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[P]redominance 
is met ‘when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a sim-
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Consider a prototypical example first. In securities fraud cases, when 
a defendant makes a single, material fraudulent statement (the conduct 
component), investors will experience different damages and some may 
not be harmed at all (eligibility components). If each plaintiff sued indi-
vidually, courts would hear similar evidence of the defendant’s miscon-
duct repeatedly. The evidence used to prove the defendant’s misstate-
ment, in other words, is functionally equivalent and could be proven 
collectively. But substantive doctrines like fraud-on-the-market and sta-
tistical methods for modeling damages also make it possible for plain-
tiffs to collectively prove eligibility components like reliance and dam-
ages. The procedural effect is that common questions tend to 
predominate over individual ones, making securities class actions easier 
to certify under Rule 23(b)(3). 
The trick then is to replicate that result in other cases: to repackage 
ordinary breach of contract or negligence claims into substantive law 
like RICO or medical monitoring where courts focus on defendant’s 
conduct, not individual harms.122 For example, after early efforts to cer-
tify negligence claims against tobacco companies failed to satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance,123 plaintiffs tried to use medical monitoring to 
shift the court’s attention to the defendant’s wrongful conduct and away 
from smokers’ individual circumstances.124 But the class in Barnes v. 
American Tobacco Co. was reversed on appeal. Defining class member-
ship based on whether one was addicted to nicotine introduced eligibility 
components and unraveled the focus on defendants’ conduct.125 In Do-
novan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., however, attorneys successfully de-
 
ultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class mem-
bers’ individual position.’” (quoting In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D. 
Minn. 1995))); Nagareda, supra note 24, at 101–02 (“[A]ggregate proof then seeks to trigger 
the application of substantive doctrine in such a way as to suggest a common, class-wide 
wrong attributable to the defendant.”). 
122 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199–1200 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (considering RICO 
claims in conjunction with other economic damage claims). 
123 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741–42 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertify-
ing an issue class as to core liability issues for failing to meet the predominance standard). 
124 Nagareda, supra note 24, at 119. 
125 161 F.3d 127, 145 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Gargano v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 10-
24042, 2011 WL 2445869, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011) (decertifying a medical monitoring 
class under Florida law); Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-CV-224(CBA)(SMG), 
2011 WL 338425, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011) (decertifying a medical monitoring class un-
der New York law). 
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fined the medical-monitoring class using pack years126 and targeted the 
defendant’s conduct under Massachusetts law, which simply required 
plaintiffs to show “that an available design modification would reduce 
risk.”127 
Tobacco plaintiffs used RICO in much the same way as medical mon-
itoring. Portraying their injury in economic terms based on the cigarette 
market allowed plaintiffs to downplay eligibility components.128 At the 
time, RICO required individual proof of reliance and proximate cause 
(both eligibility components), which doomed the predominance inquiry 
on appeal.129 But the Supreme Court later clarified that RICO plaintiffs 
need not show reliance either “as an element of [their] claim or as a pre-
requisite to establishing proximate causation.”130 Thus, the gambit might 
gain more traction today. 
Similar strategies for aggregating proof can be seen in employment 
discrimination under Title VII. When the defendant’s conduct affects 
plaintiffs uniformly through a single policy for assigning accounts to 
brokers or a biased testing procedure, that evidence is common across 
the class.131 Declaratory or injunctive relief can then remedy uniform 
conduct. 
But sometimes an employer’s conduct comes into focus only if the 
court takes a bird’s eye view of multiple plaintiffs’ claims. Because most 
corporations have eliminated blatantly racist or sexist policies, a pattern 
or practice may emerge only by considering a series of individual cir-
cumstances. The proof is not aggregate proof. Like pointillism, the full 
picture emerges not from a single dot but from proving how an employer 
treated many different individuals. Yet judges tend to deny class certifi-
cation in these cases because they characterize them as separate discrim-
 
126 “[A] ‘pack-year’ is the average number of packs of cigarettes smoked per day multi-
plied by the number of years the person has smoked. One pack a day for twenty years, for 
example, equals twenty pack-years.” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-12234-
DJC, 2012 WL 957633, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012). 
127 Id. at *25. 
128 Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1127–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Nagareda, supra note 24, at 145. 
129 McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 223–28 (2d Cir. 2008). 
130 Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 656 (2008). 
131 E.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982) (suggesting biased testing 
procedures would satisfy commonality and typicality); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (certifying account distribu-
tion and teaming policies). 
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ination claims stemming from an array of individual incidents.132 Thus, 
courts have properly denied certification in cases like Rutstein v. Avis 
Rent-A-Car Systems, where plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the in-
dividualized circumstances of why they were denied car rentals to show 
religious animus on Avis’s part,133 and Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, 
Inc., where each plaintiff would have to prove why they were denied ac-
commodations or given dirty hotel rooms to show racial discrimina-
tion.134 
Accordingly, Title VII litigants increasingly invoke statistical proof to 
magically transform what might ordinarily be seen as a “bottom-up,” 
noncertifiable claim into one that looks common across the corpus of 
plaintiffs in a “top-down” fashion. Take the evidence presented in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, for example.135 Wal-Mart had an anti-
discrimination policy, but plaintiffs alleged that the tap-on-the-shoulder 
practice of giving supervisors promotion discretion disparately impacted 
female employees.136 Plaintiffs’ lawyers offered anecdotal experiences 
and economic regression analyses showing “statistically significant dis-
parities between men and women at Wal-Mart [that] . . . can be ex-
plained only by gender discrimination.”137 If offered alone, plaintiffs’ 
anecdotal experiences would be no different than Rutstein or Motel 6—
factfinders could infer wrongdoing on Wal-Mart’s part only by first con-
sidering each employee’s experience and then taking a bird’s eye view 
of that collective evidence. But the economic regression analysis tried to 
 
132 Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing certification on 
breach of contract claims because commonalities were outweighed by individual issues), ab-
rogated on other grounds by Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639.  
133 211 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying class certification because “[e]ach 
plaintiff [would] have to bring forth evidence demonstrating that the defendant had an intent 
to treat him or her less favorably because of the plaintiff’s Jewish ethnicity”). 
134 130 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying class certification because plaintiffs’ 
proof would have “require[d] distinctly case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding 
each alleged incident of discrimination”). 
135 Nagareda, supra note 24, at 156. 
136 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
137 Id. at 2554–56. Plaintiffs also introduced a social framework analysis, but it was 
plagued by credibility and reliability questions. See John Monahan, Laurens Walker & 
Gregory Mitchell, The Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 8 L., Probability & Risk 307, 
308 (2009) (noting that “general social science research can provide a valuable context for 
deciding case-specific factual issues” but those findings “cannot be linked by an expert wit-
ness to the facts of a specific case;” rather, those links “must be recognized as arguments to 
be made by the attorneys, rather than evidentiary proof that can be offered by expert wit-
nesses”). 
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do this for the factfinder; it created aggregate workforce data by compar-
ing the number of women promoted with the number of women in the 
hourly worker pool.138 Nevertheless, the illusion of aggregate proof 
failed. 
When a defendant’s conduct is decentralized and requires proof of the 
plaintiffs’ individual circumstances, attempts to mask heterogeneity 
through statistical proof do not fare well. And, as a procedural mecha-
nism, issue classes should not change that result. But the tobacco exam-
ples are different. They illustrate ways in which plaintiffs’ lawyers engi-
neer substantive doctrine to isolate defendant’s conduct and facilitate 
aggregate resolution. The conduct itself was uniform—either tobacco 
companies manipulated nicotine levels or they did not. The eligibility 
components were the problem: Adjudicating plaintiffs’ eligibility for re-
lief alongside defendant’s conduct risked undermining aggregate treat-
ment altogether. In situations like these, issue classes can perform some 
heavy lifting by divorcing conduct components from eligibility compo-
nents and situating the former for certification. 
C. Implications for Issue Classes 
This discussion of conduct versus eligibility components and aggre-
gate proof has at least six critical implications for issue classes. First, the 
obvious: When the underlying substantive law discards individualized 
proof as to eligibility components, it makes it possible to certify other-
wise disparate issues for aggregate adjudication. Those issues can like-
wise add to the tableau of commonalities under Rule 23(b)(3). The same 
is true when substantive law, like RICO, focuses judges’ attention on a 
defendant’s conduct as opposed to plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief. 
Second, the circumstances under which plaintiffs offer statistical and 
economic proof should inform its effect on certification. When the un-
derlying law governing eligibility components already treats plaintiffs as 
a unit (think fraud-on-the-market in securities cases or reliance in 
RICO), offering expert models is logical and widely accepted, provided 
they are reliable under Daubert.139 But plaintiffs have also offered statis-
tical and economic models to satisfy substantive law that ordinarily de-
 
138 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. 
139 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Be-
tween “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas 
of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1041, 1065–79 (2004). 
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mands individual proof. This move seeks to agglomerate individual eli-
gibility components via expert testimony and statistical methodology. 
In both Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend 
the Supreme Court rejected agglomerated evidence of conduct and eligi-
bility components, respectively. As to conduct components, Wal-Mart’s 
practice of giving supervisors discretion over hiring and promotion deci-
sions eliminated the possibility of common proof via an official top-
down policy. Thus, to prove a disparate impact, plaintiffs had to show 
that supervisors exercised their discretion in a discriminatory way. But 
to do that without offering a series of individual factual scenarios that, 
taken together, painted a picture of sex discrimination required agglom-
erated economic regression analyses. When deconstructed, however, that 
analysis was similar to Rutstein and Motel 6—the defendant’s conduct 
was not uniform.140 
In Comcast, antitrust plaintiffs had to prove their damages—an eligi-
bility component. To do so, they introduced a damage model. The prob-
lem here, however, was not the use of agglomerated proof, per se, but 
that the model took all four of plaintiffs’ antitrust theories into account 
as opposed to the only theory certified for class treatment—the over-
builder theory.141 But the takeaway here is different from Dukes. Be-
cause the defect stemmed from an evidentiary question of reliability,142 
reliable models could still eliminate the need to adjudicate plaintiffs’ 
damages individually. Put simply, when agglomerated evidence tries to 
turn a defendant’s decentralized conduct toward discrete individuals into 
uniform conduct, the illusion fails. But when a defendant’s common 
conduct injures plaintiffs, plaintiffs might successfully introduce reliable 
statistical methods to prove eligibility for damages so long as substan-
tive law permits aggregate proof. 
Third, situating a defendant’s conduct as what glues class members 
together, regardless of the type of class, may unify what might otherwise 
be a disparate group of people and inform the commonality inquiries 
 
140 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing Mo-
tel 6 and Rutstein). 
141 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013). 
142 As the dissenters in Comcast point out, Comcast never objected to the damage model. 
Id. at 1436–37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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under both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3).143 Even though some class members 
may have bonds that pre- or post-date the litigation, that bond is not 
what commonality tests: It tests cohesiveness for adjudication. So, as 
Dukes requires, class-wide proceedings that adjudicate a defendant’s 
conduct can generate common answers and help resolve the litigation.144 
Fourth, when plaintiffs request indivisible relief to alleviate a defend-
ant’s conduct, partial certification might fall within Rule 23(b)(2)’s 
mandatory ambit.145 Rule 23(b)(2) requires the defendant to have “acted 
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that fi-
nal injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate re-
specting the class as a whole.”146 Setting aside eligibility components 
such as damage claims and focusing on declaratory or injunctive relief 
can pave the way to certify a mandatory class even in cases like con-
sumer fraud. For example, in Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, plaintiffs created 
a permissible, nationwide (b)(2) class requesting six declarations center-
ing on whether the defendant’s windows were defective, but left eligibil-
ity components like proximate cause and damages for individual deter-
mination.147 
Some might claim that this creates a due process problem: Losing a 
mandatory issue class could preclude individual damage trials without 
affording members the right to opt out under Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts.148 But this view misunderstands the distinction between uniform 
and decentralized misconduct. As Dukes, Motel 6, and Rutstein illus-
trate, decentralized conduct cannot be raised or adjudicated in class-wide 
proceedings;149 individual claims should not be certified or precluded. 
But if the defendant’s conduct is uniform, a mandatory issue class can 
 
143 In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 816 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the com-
monalities as to defendant’s conduct could be tried separately from liability issues and that it 
was thus “‘possible to satisfy the predominance . . . requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in a mass 
tort or mass accident class action’ despite the particular need in such cases for individualized 
damages calculations”). 
144 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
145 E.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010); Allan v. Int’l Truck & 
Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2004). 
146 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 
147 Pella Corp., 606 F.3d at 392–93. 
148 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 n.3 (1985) (requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an 
opportunity to opt out when an action seeks to bind plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or 
predominantly for money judgments but not extending that view to equitable class actions). 
149 See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
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level the playing field and avoid inconsistent judgments so long as the 
substantive doctrine does not vary much from state to state.150 Thus, un-
less plaintiffs were inadequately represented, their damage claims 
should be precluded if the defendant wins.151 
Fifth, distinguishing between conduct and eligibility components in-
forms not only commonality, but Rule 23(a)’s other queries as well. 
Typicality tests whether a defendant’s conduct toward the class repre-
sentative is typical of how a defendant’s conduct affected other class 
members and thus screens decentralized conduct.152 Numerosity consid-
ers whether the group affected by a defendant’s conduct is so wide-
spread that representative litigation makes sense.153 And the adequate 
representation requirement, which often poses a stumbling block, should 
prove less disruptive when courts certify conduct components. Most dis-
abling conflicts arise from eligibility components like reliance, loss cau-
sation, and damages, which tend to be more individuated.154 When 
courts just certify a defendant’s conduct, they should tolerate greater 
conflicts because plaintiffs share an objective focus on establishing a de-
fendant’s liability. Thus, unless class counsel acts contrary to the class’s 
best interest or attempts to represent an over-inclusive group where the 
 
150 See infra Subsection III.B.2 (discussing resource parity and outcome equality).  
151 See infra notes 334–42 and accompanying text (discussing inadequate representation). 
152 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 
153 Id. 23(a)(1).  
154 See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“De-
spite this court’s view to the contrary, appellate class action decisions have held that issues 
of reliance, loss-causation, and injury are inappropriate for aggregation, due to the need to 
prove these elements on an individualized basis for each victim or injured party.”) (citing 
decisions). See generally Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, 
§ 2.02 cmt. a (“[A]ccumulated experience with the class-action device suggests that aggre-
gate treatment of a common issue will materially advance the resolution of multiple civil 
claims more frequently when the issue concerns ‘upstream’ matters focused on the generally 
applicable conduct of those opposing the claimants in the litigation as distinct from ‘down-
stream’ matters focused on those claimants themselves.”). 
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requested relief could be detrimental to some class members,155 repre-
sentation should be adequate.156 
Finally, there are two precautions. First, certifying an issue class 
should not become a backdoor to plenary certification via a settlement 
class action. If judges conduct their issue class inquiry as this Article 
suggests, then certifying a settlement class must entail a separate Rule 
23 analysis. Because settlement classes encompass all aspects of a case, 
they can raise new intra-class conflicts. Moreover, a distinct certification 
analysis serves as an additional safeguard against weak lawyers negoti-
ating and certifying weak settlements. Second, when conduct compo-
nents and eligibility components are intertwined within a single legal el-
ement, issue classes should not serve as an excuse to create “sterile” 
trials. For instance, in design-defect cases, states often employ a risk-
utility test that considers the product’s utility to the public and the indi-
vidual user. Consequently, evaluating a defendant’s liability may necessi-
tate not only assessing whether a safer and reasonably priced alternative 
existed, but also testimony from exemplar plaintiffs about the product’s 
utility—or lack thereof. 
 
155 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (attempting to include blacks within 
a class seeking to enforce a racially restrictive covenant); Spano v. Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 
574, 587 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that many proposed class members had no complaint about 
ERISA investment opportunities and would be harmed by the relief the named plaintiffs re-
quested); Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing 
that the proposed class included people who claimed they were harmed by the same acts that 
benefitted others). 
156 Burch, supra note 78, at 3044, 3061. Conflicts over eligibility elements include issues 
like differences over remedies and insurance coverage. E.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perfor-
mance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (subclassing a class action 
because of different statutes of limitation); Maloney v. Califano, 88 F.R.D. 293, 294–95 
(D.N.M. 1980) (subclassing based on the time taken by the government to make individual 
disability determinations). As to how remedies might divide members, if some claimants re-
quired immediate medical attention, they would receive far less benefit from a settlement 
that provided research funds. See generally Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 160 
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (including claimants who had to have their heart valve removed immedi-
ately and thus did not benefit from the settlement’s research and development fund without 
special representation); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Mass Tort Settlement Class 
Actions: Five Case Studies 43 (1998) (expressing concern over the lack of separate represen-
tation in Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.). 
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III. THE PARITY AND PROMISE OF ISSUE CLASSES 
Making the analytical move toward understanding and classifying the 
elements in any claim or defense as related to either a defendants’ con-
duct or plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief, combined with an understanding 
of how the methods for proving those components can contribute to or 
undermine their aggregate nature sets the stage for courts’ greater use of 
issue classes. Issue classes can circumvent the mismatch between private 
attorneys’ regulatory reach in light of stricter certification standards and 
a defendant’s nationwide conduct.157 Currently, even when a defendant 
acts uniformly, eligibility components inject variances that have ren-
dered class certification unlikely. But issue classes can do what plain-
tiffs’ attorneys have tried to accomplish through manipulating substan-
tive law and representing only a subset of claims: They can spotlight a 
defendant’s conduct. Issue classes are thus well positioned to eliminate 
the most egregious aspects of the prism effect, recapture for both public 
and private regulators what is common to all of them, and resolve a de-
fendants’ conduct on the merits. 
Nevertheless, a host of logistical, doctrinal, and political questions 
remains. These questions range from the mechanics of Rule 23, parties’ 
incentives, and accuracy and fairness considerations to the pragmatics of 
issue classes in multidistrict litigation. Accordingly, this Part explores 
the following questions: When are issue classes appropriate within Rule 
23’s framework and how do choice-of-law concerns affect that inquiry? 
How can fees incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to initiate issue classes 
when the compensation structure is predicated on the presence of a 
common fund? How can defendants be assured of two-way preclusion? 
Might additional error-correcting mechanisms prevent undue settlement 
pressure? How and when should transferee judges remand cases to trans-
feror courts? And can issue classes coordinate the public and private 
regulatory response while preventing Seventh Amendment Reexamina-
tion Clause concerns?  
 
157 Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Experts Say Recent Seventh Circuit Ruling May Not Make ‘Is-
sue Certification’ Trendy, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 9, 2012) (quoting Professor 
John C. Coffee, Jr., “I have long argued that ‘partial’ or ‘issue’ certification is the only way 
out of the dilemma created by the increasingly rigid judicial interpretation of the predomi-
nance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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A. Constructing Functional Issue Classes 
Despite the promise of issue classes, in years past, courts and com-
mentators diverged over whether and when to certify them. Those divi-
sions stemmed, in part, from the scant guidance in Rule 23(c)(4), which 
simply states, “When appropriate, an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”158 Judges thus 
created a substantial body of federal common law to fill in the gaps, but 
their initial solutions were haphazard and varied. Recent years have wit-
nessed a greater convergence on that front, but new divisions over 
whether class members are “ascertainable” have sparked different de-
bates.159 
1. Materially Advancing the Resolution of the Claim 
Courts’ once sharp divisions over whether and when to certify issue 
classes have softened substantially in the wake of Comcast and Dukes. 
Several recent appellate decisions suggest a greater willingness to certify 
issue classes in toxic torts,160 product liability,161 consumer protection,162 
and employment discrimination.163 The principal disagreement in the 
debate once centered on Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry: Could 
litigants slice an issue from the litigation’s constellation of questions and 
conduct a predominance inquiry as to only that issue, or must a judge 
first decide that common questions predominate over individual ones 
such that Rule 23(c)(4) becomes a housekeeping tool to manage what is 
already a manageable class? For a while the Fifth Circuit consistently 
adhered to the latter view,164 but recently changed course in In re Deep-
 
158 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 
159 As the Rule 23 subcommittee contemplates changes to the Rule, this suggests that no 
changes are needed to Rule 23(c)(4), but might be appropriate as to “ascertainability.” 
160 In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 806–07, 816 (5th Cir. 2014). 
161 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool 
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 853–54 (6th Cir. 2013).  
162 Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010). 
163 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
164 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745–46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The proper 
interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of ac-
tion, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a 
housekeeping rule . . . .”); see also Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-
Run, 52 Emory L.J. 709, 748 (2003) (arguing that Rule 23 “never intended . . . to authorize 
expansive issue class actions”); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Cli-
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water Horizon.165 The First,166 Second,167 Third,168 Fourth,169 Sixth,170 
Seventh,171 Ninth,172 and Eleventh173 Circuits have each taken various 
approaches that facilitate issue classes to different degrees. Perhaps due 
 
ent, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 955 (1998) (noting that the predominance requirement “has 
generally been understood (and I think correctly) to override the possibility of certification 
of a class on particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) unless those issues are found to ‘predomi-
nate’ over the individual ones in the case”).  
165 Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 806 (observing that the district court had planned to 
sever liability from damage issues and try them separately, noting that plan accorded “with 
this court’s previous case law and Rule 23(c)(4),” and favorably citing Butler, 727 F.3d at 
800 (“[A] class action limited to determining liability on a class-wide basis, with separate 
hearings to determine—if liability is established—the damages of individual class members, 
or homogeneous groups of class members, is permitted by Rule 23(c)(4) and will often be 
the sensible way to proceed.”)). 
166 The First Circuit has not said explicitly how it would evaluate the predominance in-
quiry within issue classes but has noted that “even if individualized determinations were 
necessary to calculate damages, Rule 23(c)(4)(A) would still allow the court to maintain the 
class action with respect to other issues.” Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 41 
(1st Cir. 2003). 
167 In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] court 
may employ subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to liability regardless of whether the claim 
as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.”). 
168 Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the approach 
advocated by the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation and suggesting that trial 
courts consider a series of factors).  
169 Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2003) (“According 
to the dissent, a district court must first ‘determine that’ an entire lawsuit ‘as [a] 
whole’ . . . satisfies the predominance and superiority requirements imposed by 23(b)(3) and 
only if the entire lawsuit does satisfy these requirements may a court ‘manage[ ] through or-
ders authorized by 23(c).’ The dissent’s argument finds no support in the law—not in Rule 
23 itself nor in any case or treatise.”). 
170 In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860–61 
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘when adjudication of questions of liability common to the class 
will achieve economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally satis-
fied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate’[,]” mentioning the availability of 
Rules 23(c)(4) and (c)(5), and concluding that certifying a liability class would further econ-
omies of scale and make a negative-value consumer class possible) (quoting Comcast Corp. 
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1437 (2013)). 
171 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013); McReynolds v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2012); Mejdrech v. 
Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2003). 
172 Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). 
173 Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2009) (permitting 
hybrid class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(c)(4)); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 
1241, 1258–59, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (conducting the predominance inquiry as to the RICO 
claim and certifying that claim but not a claim for breach of contract). 
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to this emerging consensus, the Supreme Court has declined multiple 
opportunities to weigh in.174 
In 2010, the American Law Institute approved the Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation, which sets forth a workable view of pre-
dominance that considerably eases the presumed friction between Rule 
23(b)(3) and (c)(4). Richard Nagareda, the principal author of that sec-
tion, suggested that courts should certify issue classes where resolving 
the issue would “materially advance the resolution of multiple civil 
claims by addressing the core of the dispute in a manner superior to oth-
er realistic procedural alternatives, so as to generate significant judicial 
efficiencies.”175 Accordingly, courts should certify classes even if ag-
gregate treatment as to just one issue materially resolves class members’ 
claims.176 The superiority requirement is embedded in both the “materi-
ally advance” language and, more obviously, as a condition that certify-
ing the issue would be “superior to other realistic alternatives” such that 
it “generate[s] significant judicial efficiencies.”177 
Oftentimes in collective litigation, resolving a core question—
typically one that centers on the defendant’s conduct—can have a dom-
ino effect on all the cases. When that occurs, certifying the issue materi-
ally advances litigants’ claims. Consider a nonclass example such as a 
basic bus accident. Regardless of whether the bus contains two or eighty 
passengers, resolving fundamental questions over driver negligence or 
product malfunction removes eligibility components and advances the 
litigation; it prevents disparate questions over each passenger’s damages 
 
174 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013) (remanding for further consid-
eration in light of Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1426). 
175 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.02(a)(1); see also  
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring issue classes 
to “materially advance the litigation”); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472–
73 (5th Cir. 1986) (“It is difficult to imagine that class jury findings on the class questions 
[regarding the state-of-the-art defense] will not significantly advance the resolution of the 
underlying hundreds of cases.”); Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.24 (4th ed. 2004) 
(suggesting that aggregate treatment should “materially advance[] the disposition of the liti-
gation as a whole”). Using this standard avoids what David Rosenberg has characterized as 
the “myopia of proceduralist analysis” by “reorient[ing] discussion towards a tort-policy per-
spective.” David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in 
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 210, 214 (1996). 
176 See Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to 
Regulating Class Actions, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 995, 1005 (2005) (“[I]t is the lack of substantial 
dissimilarity that makes class actions a fair and procedurally viable means of rendering 
judgment for or against the class and its members.”). 
177 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.02(a)(1). 
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from undermining the judge’s ability to adjudicate a core question. Oth-
erwise, judges around the country would hear the same evidence many 
times—risking conflicting opinions as to the same conduct and under-
mining judicial efficiency. When adjudicating a common issue signifi-
cantly advances the litigation, it is ripe for issue certification.178 Thus, 
some courts have properly separated eligibility components such as 
plaintiffs’ specific and proximate causation,179 reliance, and damages180 
to facilitate issue classes in employment-discrimination,181 environmen-
tal-contamination,182 and consumer-fraud litigation.183 
 
178 Id. See generally In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Prac-
tices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS (FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *4 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (“[W]hen common questions present a significant aspect of the case and 
they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear justi-
fication for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis.” 
(quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998))); Galvan v. KDI 
Distrib., Inc., No. SACV 08-0999-JVS (ANX), 2011 WL 5116585, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2011) (“[I]n general, predominance is met when there exists generalized evidence which 
proves or disproves an [issue or] element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such 
proof obviates the need to examine each class members’ individual position.” (quoting In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002))).  
179 E.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ut proximate 
cause is an individual issue and will not be addressed by the class jury. . . . Issues of causa-
tion and damages issues, such as whether that defect caused the damage to a particular win-
dow and how much the design contributed to the rot, will be handled individually.”); De 
Gidio v. Perpich, 612 F. Supp. 1383, 1386–87 (D. Minn. 1985) (“Accordingly, under Rule 
23(c)(4)(A), the court will confine the class action to those issues pertaining to the alleged 
constitutional violation and injunctive relief. Thus individuals will be required to present ev-
idence of causation and their particular damages separately.”). 
180 E.g., Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The individua-
tion of damages in consumer class actions is rarely determinative under Rule 23(b)(3). 
Where, as here, common questions predominate regarding liability, then courts generally 
find the predominance requirement to be satisfied even if individual damages issues re-
main.”); Nieberding v. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 600, 618 (D. Kan. 2014) 
(certifying liability issues for class treatment but reserving the damages issue for a later date 
if plaintiffs prevail on liability); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 292 
F.R.D. 652, 674–75 (D. Kan. 2013) (certifying an issue class and noting that “[d]etermining 
each class members’ damages, if any, may require individualized determinations”); Ellis v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (addressing damages sepa-
rately from the issue of certification). 
181 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th 
Cir. 2012); Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2004). 
182 Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003). 
183 In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 861 
(6th Cir. 2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2013); Pella 
Corp., 606 F.3d at 395. 
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But moving from a basic bus accident—even with an alleged product 
defect—to manufacturing a defective product such as a drug or medical 
device that causes “downstream” injuries184 shifts courts’ certification 
calculus dramatically when plaintiffs hope to certify general causation. 
Courts have certified conduct-related defenses to general causation such 
as the military contractor defense in the Agent Orange litigation and the 
state-of-the-art defense in asbestos,185 yet they tend to eschew issue-
class treatment on general causation.186 Nevertheless, a similar trifurcat-
ed trial (with general causation tried first) saved substantial time in over 
600 consolidated Bendectin cases.187 
Although general causation focuses on the defendant’s conduct, there 
is a persistent stigma that certification cannot materially advance the 
claims’ resolution because courts must still determine eligibility compo-
nents, such as specific causation and damages.188 Yet, when the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the decision to certify the state-of-the-art defense in as-
bestos, it concluded: 
It is difficult to imagine that class jury findings on the class questions 
will not significantly advance the resolution of the underlying hun-
dreds of cases. . . . Judge Parker’s plan is clearly superior to the alter-
native of repeating, hundreds of times over, the litigation of the state 
of the art issues with, as that experienced judge says, “days of the 
same witnesses, exhibits and issues from trial to trial.”189 
This logic holds in more recent mass-tort cases. 
In the Vioxx litigation, for example, Judge Eldon Fallon conceded 
that Merck’s conduct components were uniform: “[C]ommon questions 
of fact exist regarding the development, manufacturing, and testing of 
Vioxx” as well as “Vioxx’s effects on the human body.”190 But, citing 
 
184 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.02 cmt. a. 
185 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472–473 (5th Cir. 1986) (“It is difficult 
to imagine that class jury findings on the class questions [regarding the state-of-the-art de-
fense] will not significantly advance the resolution of the underlying hundreds of cases.”). 
186 See, e.g., In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 205 (D. Minn. 2003) (“While 
these claims involve common issues, they also involve individual issues such as injury, cau-
sation, the learned intermediary doctrine and comparative fault.”). 
187 In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 293–94 (6th Cir. 1988); see also infra notes 233–
38 and accompanying text (discussing Bendectin and the potential benefits to defendants). 
188 Accuracy presents a competing concern in product liability cases, which is addressed in 
Subsection III.B.3. 
189 Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 472–73. 
190 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. La. 2006). 
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the Fifth Circuit’s now outdated predominance test, diverse substantive 
laws, and the need to resolve eligibility components such as specific 
causation and damages, he denied certification.191 
Yet, had Judge Fallon been open to grouping similar state laws or if 
state law had been functionally equivalent, resolving general causation 
in an issue class might have materially advanced the claims’ resolution: 
Merck’s deceptive marketing practices and scientific misconduct were 
central issues in each trial—so much so that Judge Carol Higbee bifur-
cated New Jersey test cases along those lines.192 The first phase ad-
dressed common conduct issues such as whether Merck failed to warn 
patients that Vioxx posed cardiovascular risks, and the second phase ad-
dressed eligibility components like specific causation.193 Thus, solving 
choice-of-law problems or determining whether state laws on conduct 
components were similar might tee up a defendant’s conduct for issue 
class certification. Limited certification might also prove superior to 
nonclass alternatives, which in Vioxx meant incorporating coercive pro-
visions to rope as many plaintiffs as possible into the settlement.194 Ac-
cordingly, even in mass torts, courts should consider certifying conduct-
related components.195 
Requiring that issue classes materially advance the cases’ resolution 
incorporates a pragmatic backstop that serves to limit even conduct 
components. Adjudicating a defendant’s conduct collectively is benefi-
cial only when conduct is uniform—even if it affects plaintiffs dissimi-
larly. For example, in Klay v. Humana, Inc., the defendants “utilized 
many different form contracts” and “contracted with different types of 
care-providing entities.”196 Thus, even though “[a] breach is a breach is a 
breach,”197 a defendant’s contractual obligations differed in ways that 
made certifying conduct components impossible. 
 
191 Id. at 462–63. 
192 Snigdh Prakesh, All the Justice Money Can Buy 24–35 (2011). But see generally Roger 
H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 79 (con-
tending that “[m]ass trials on the issue of ‘general’ causation create substantial savings only 
when plaintiffs lose because this leads immediately to the dismissal of large numbers of 
mass tort claims”). 
193 Prakesh, supra note 192, at 24–35. 
194 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. La. 2009). 
195 Campos, supra note 88, at 1068–69, 1072. 
196 382 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v. 
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). 
197 Id. at 1263. 
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2. Choice of Law 
When state law governs a defendant’s conduct, choice-of-law ques-
tions can complicate issue classes. Nevertheless, the need for state law 
alone should not signal that issue classes are inappropriate. There are 
several circumstances in which choosing the applicable law need not 
pose a barrier. 
First, as in some contractual warranty cases, a single state’s law may 
apply across the board.198 Second, certain forum states’ choice-of-law 
rules may dictate that one state’s law should apply to the entire class. 
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied Michigan law to a 
nationwide breach-of-warranty class action against DaimlerChrysler be-
cause the defendant made its “decisions concerning the design, manufac-
ture, and distribution” there and “Michigan is the only state where con-
duct relevant to all class members occurred.”199 Third, the substantive 
law may not vary from state to state, and thus may create no conflict.200 
When this is the case, the forum can apply a single law to all class mem-
bers, and typically selects its own state law.201 
 
198 See, e.g., In re Detwiler, 305 F. App’x 353, 355 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying a contractual 
choice-of-law provision specifying that Florida law must govern); Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.05(b)(1). 
199 Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 626 (Okla. 2003); see also Int’l Union 
of Operating Eng’rs v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-3015-03, 2005 WL 2205341, at *1, *5 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 29, 2005) (certifying a nationwide class of third-party payors 
in the Vioxx litigation by applying New Jersey law). Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric 
Manufacturing Co., a federal court sitting in Oklahoma would have to apply Oklahoma’s 
choice-of-law provision, suggesting that the same outcome could result in federal court. 313 
U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Of course, a defendant’s principal place of business emerges as a 
common feature only by virtue of the class device; in individual litigation, it would stand out 
no more than where the plaintiff purchased the car. Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in 
Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 661, 673 (2005). 
200 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.05(b)(2); see, e.g., In 
re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As courts have 
noted, state contract law defines breach consistently such that the question will usually be 
the same in all jurisdictions.”); Klay, 382 F.3d at 1263 (“A breach is a breach is a 
breach . . . .”); accord Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 n.8 (1995) (“[C]ontract 
law is not at its core ‘diverse, nonuniform, and confusing.’”); In re Digitek Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2:08-md-01968, 2010 WL 2102330, at *6 (W.D. Va. May 25, 2010) (“Step one 
[of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] involves analyzing if ‘an actual conflict 
exists . . . .’ If no conflict exists, then I can just apply a single set of laws to the entire class’ 
claims.”). 
201 In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., 257 F.R.D. 46, 56 (D.N.J. 2009), opin-
ion clarified by 267 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D.N.J. 2010), opinion modified on reconsideration by 
No. 07-2720 (DRD), 2010 WL 2976496, at *15–16 (D.N.J. July 22, 2010) (applying New 
Jersey’s choice-of-law rules to a consumer fraud class and deciding that New Jersey law 
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Even when state laws vary, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be able to place 
them into a few categories such that an issue class could adjudicate 
common conduct components across a particular group.202 As one noted 
conflicts scholar explained, “while in theory all fifty states could have 
different laws, in practice there are seldom more than two or three rules 
on any given question, each adopted by many states.”203 And those dif-
ferences principally arise with regard to eligibility components. In prod-
uct liability laws, for example, states differ most over comparative fault 
and statutes of limitation,204 not a defendant’s conduct.205 Even though 
 
would apply because it had the greatest interest). While a general presumption in favor of 
applying forum law exists, state courts have split over whether that presumption applies in 
class actions. Compare Ferrell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 P.3d 1156, 1163–64 (N.M. 2008) (“If 
the defendant fails to bring any ‘clearly established contradictory law’ to the court’s atten-
tion, the district court cannot be faulted if it concludes that the laws of the jurisdic-
tions . . . do not conflict such that a single state’s law may be applied to the entire class.”), 
and Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1081–82 (Cal. 2001) (presuming that 
forum law should apply), with Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672 
(Tex. 2004) (conflating the choice-of-law burden with plaintiffs’ certification burden), and 
Dragon v. Vanguard Indus., 89 P.3d 908, 918 (Kan. 2004) (requiring the class proponent to 
show that there are no significant differences in states’ law). 
202 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.05(b)(3); see, e.g., 
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (certifying “six state subclasses 
demonstrates that the district court carefully considered how the case would proceed, explic-
itly finding that the consumer protection acts of these six states have nearly identical ele-
ments”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(expressing a willingness “to certify nationwide classes on the ground that relatively minor 
differences in state law could be overcome at trial by grouping similar state laws together 
and applying them as a unit”); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 998–1000 (3d Cir. 
1986) (certifying nationwide classes with four subgroups based on state law differences); see 
also Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 594 (9th Cir. 2012) (expressing no view 
on whether remanded consumer protection claims could be grouped into smaller classes). 
203 Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 
39 Am. J. Comp. L. 465, 475 (1991). 
204 Statutes of limitations vary based on length, tolling periods, injuries suffered, and types 
of claim. E.g., La. Civil Code Ann. art. 3492 (2014) (tolling one year from the date of inju-
ry); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2014) (allowing five years for claims involving personal 
injury or property damage). And states differ substantially on how a plaintiff’s fault affects 
recovery. Compare Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 75 So. 3d 624, 645 (Ala. 2011) (barring 
recovery for plaintiffs who are contributorily negligent), with Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 
816 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Alaska 1991) (using comparative fault for products liability), Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-817 to -823 (LexisNexis 2014) (same), and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-
216 (2014) (using modified comparative fault that allows plaintiffs to recover so long as 
fault is less than fifty percent). 
205 When determining whether a defendant created a defective product, most states have 
adopted either a consumer-expectancy test or risk-benefit analysis, with some states adopting 
both as potential ways to prove a product defect. Even states that have adopted a single 
method take the other method into account. See, e.g., Flemister v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 
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this approach can pose the most hurdles in terms of collecting and clus-
tering statutes, common law, and jury instructions, that undertaking be-
comes part of plaintiffs’ burden only once the court concludes that the 
forum state’s law differs from other states’ laws (as opposed to a “false 
conflict”).206 Only then does the party seeking to certify a class have the 
burden of proving that states’ laws fall into limited patterns that courts 
can adjudicate collectively.207 As the next Subsection explains, crafting 
an adjudication plan could aid parties in meeting this burden. 
3. “Ascertainability” and Precision 
Issue classes further aggregation’s goals of enforcing substantive 
rights, promoting efficiency, ensuring finality, and encouraging accuracy 
and consistency through issue preclusion. 208 Although preclusion doc-
trines vary by state, most explain that where the first lawsuit actually lit-
igates and determines the same issue with a valid, final judgment, that 
suit prevents subsequent cases from relitigating the issue so long as it 
was essential to the first judgment.209 Some states add a mutuality com-
ponent, which requires subsequent suits to involve the same parties or 
their privies as the first one.210 But most states permit nonmutual issue 
 
So. 2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1998) (applying a risk-utility test while considering consumer expecta-
tions); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a 
modified consumer-expectations test that also considers the product’s risk and the feasibility 
of an alternative design). Only a few states have chosen one test while rejecting the other as 
a factor to consider. See, e.g., Agrofollajes, S.A. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 48 
So. 3d 976, 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (adopting a risk-utility test); Rahmig v. Mosley 
Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 69–70 (Neb. 1987) (using the consumer-expectations test); Sims 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 365 (Wyo. 1988) (adopting the consumer-expectations 
test).  
206 The Constitution permits courts to presume that their forum law applies in deciding 
whether the forum state’s law differs from those of other states with a connection to the 
plaintiffs’ claim. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988). 
207 Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits 
Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 799, 811; 
Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1723, 1741 (2006). 
208 See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 1.03 (enumerating 
aggregation goals). 
209 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). 
210 States requiring mutuality include Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia. Steven P. Nonkes, Note, Reducing the Unfair 
Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through Damages Limits, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1459, 
1468 n.60 (2009) (citing cases); see, e.g., Sosebee v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 701 F.3d 1012, 1026 
(5th Cir. 2012) (“Unlike the federal issue preclusion rules, Louisiana still requires mutuality 
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preclusion so long as it comports with due process requirements.211 Con-
sequently, when courts certify issue classes, they must: (1) specify pre-
cisely which issues are certified, litigated, and determined; and (2) in di-
versity cases governed by state law, define the class members with care 
so that states with mutuality requirements can readily assess whether the 
plaintiff was “in privity with” the class representative in the first suit. 
Beginning with the first concern over specificity, creating an adjudi-
cation plan that contemplates Daubert motions, summary judgment mo-
tions, and special verdict forms212 can benefit both certifying courts and 
subsequent courts faced with preclusion questions.213 If the initial parties 
have trouble delineating the issue or issues to be certified, that serves as 
a substantial warning sign that certification is inappropriate. Conversely, 
adjudication plans that concretely demonstrate how aggregate treatment 
materially resolves the claims can enhance the credibility of class certi-
fication motions.214 And, even though courts cannot predetermine the res 
 
for issue preclusion.”); State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 640 (Miss. 1991) (“A 
final decision of an issue on its merits is normally thought preclusive only if there is an iden-
tity of parties from one suit to the next, and of their capacities as well. Privity, succession in 
interest, and relationship are terms used to express these identities.”).  
211 See Nonkes, supra note 210, at 1467–68 (“Today, most states have abandoned mutuali-
ty for both defensive and offensive applications of collateral estoppel. A sizeable minority, 
however, retain the traditional mutuality requirement. Still others allow only defensive use of 
nonmutual collateral estoppel.”). States that do not require mutuality for offensive or defen-
sive issue preclusion include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1467 n.59 (citing cases from 
each jurisdiction). Kentucky and Massachusetts allow offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. 
Moore v. Commonwealth of Ky., Cabinet for Human Res., 954 S.W.2d 317, 318–19 (Ky. 
1997); Coastal Oil New Eng., Inc. v. Citizens Fuels Corp., 769 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2002). Finally, states permitting only defensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion in-
clude Ohio, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Nonkes, supra note 
210, at 1468 n.61 (citing cases). Federal courts assessing federal causes of action do not re-
quire mutuality for offensive or defensive issue preclusion. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (permitting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion); Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (permitting defensive 
nonmutual issue preclusion). 
212 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a)(2) (requiring courts to instruct and explain issues to the jury). 
213 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.12. 
214 See, e.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs point 
out that they submitted a sample trial plan with a comparative legal analysis of each subclass 
state, suggestions of how the case could be tried in phases, and a statement of class structure 
and remedies.”). 
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judicata effect of their own judgments,215 forcing parties to contemplate 
the certified issue from a “same issue”216 standpoint can sharpen their 
focus and help them unravel certification’s practical consequences on 
subsequent cases.217 
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.218 provides a textbook example of the 
perils of imprecision: The Florida Supreme Court decertified a class-
wide trial that awarded $145 billion in punitive damages to Florida 
smokers, but allowed some of the jury’s factual determinations to stand 
so that class members could avoid relitigating those issues in individual 
trials.219 But the initial trial court never intended to conduct an issue 
class, so the class-wide findings were imprecise. In Engle’s aftermath, 
the parties fought vigorously over what the jury had actually deter-
mined.220 Consequently, courts certifying issue classes should take great 
 
215 Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 80 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(“Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the class, as defined, 
subdivision (c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court conducting the ac-
tion cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can be tested only in a 
subsequent action.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), advisory committee’s note)).  
216 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. c (1982) (listing factors to consider in 
deciding whether an issue is the same). 
217 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.12 cmt. b. This eases 
the court’s subsequent obligation under Rule 23(c)(1)(B), which requires the court to define 
the “class and the class claims, issues, or defenses” (emphasis added). Rule 23(c)(1)(B) 
“means that the text of the order or an incorporated opinion must include (1) a readily dis-
cernible, clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or classes to be 
certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or de-
fenses to be treated on a class basis.” Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 185, 
187–88 (3d Cir. 2006). In Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., the Third Circuit specified that its 
interpretation in Wachtel applied to issue classes. 655 F.3d 255, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2011). The 
Third Circuit’s test has gained traction in other circuits. E.g., Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 
F.3d 900, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013); In re 
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 38–41 (1st Cir. 2009); Gregurek v. 
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. CV 05-6067-GHK (FMOx), 2009 WL 4723137, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009). 
218 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). 
219 Id. at 1269. 
220 Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2010). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has denied several petitions from R.J. Reynolds to consider whether af-
fording issue preclusive effect violated the Due Process Clause. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
v. Clay, 133 S. Ct. 650 (2012) (denying certiorari); Martina S. Barash, Supreme Court Again 
Takes a Pass on Reviewing Engle’s Preclusive Effect, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 1 
(June 13, 2014) (“Tobacco companies failed for the ninth time June 9 to get the U.S. Su-
preme Court to review the constitutionality of reusing jury findings from a decertified Flori-
da tobacco class action in individual suits.”). The Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its deci-
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care to explain their summary judgment opinions and craft special ver-
dict forms to minimize preclusion challenges. 
As to the second concern, if a subsequent court requires mutuality, it 
must be able to easily determine who was a class member and is thus en-
titled to assert issue preclusion. To identify the class and meet standing 
requirements, plaintiffs’ lawyers have defined members in terms of peo-
ple harmed by the defendant’s conduct, employed subjective and objec-
tive criteria, and invoked criteria dependent on the merits.221 
But these myriad approaches have prompted frequent objections and 
some circuits have allowed defendants to turn this straightforward as-
sessment into an impossibly high “ascertainability” standard.222 For ex-
ample, defendants invoke the lack of “ascertainability” as a rationale 
against certifying small-claims consumer classes whose members are in-
herently difficult to identify.223 Other objections are the converse of one 
another: the class is overly broad because it includes both injured and 
uninjured members,224 or the class is a “fail-safe” class based on the de-
fendant’s wrongdoing because it requires establishing liability before de-
termining membership.225 
 
sion to allow issue preclusion in Engle progeny cases in 2013. Philip Morris USA v. Doug-
las, 110 So. 3d 419, 428 (Fla. 2013). 
221 Plaintiffs’ attorneys often revise their class definition after receiving class discovery 
from defendants, and should be given latitude to do so. But see John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & 
Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Where it is facially apparent from the plead-
ings that there is no ascertainable class, a district court may dismiss the class allegation on 
the pleadings.”); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2008 WL 4681368, at *10 
(E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that lack of ascertainability “alone is sufficient to warrant 
striking the Plaintiffs’ class allegations on the pleadings”).  
222 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (“An order that certifies a class action must define the 
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses . . . . ”). 
223 Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims 
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 305, 308 (2010). 
224 E.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Brief in 
Opposition of Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 1, Whirlpool Corp. v. Butler, 134 S. Ct. 1277 
(2014) (Nos. 13-430, 13-431) (“The questions presented turn on the assertion that ‘most 
members have never experienced the alleged defect,’ and that, accordingly, painstaking indi-
vidual inquiries would doom any class resolution of these cases.”). 
225 For more information on fail-safe classes, compare John Beisner et al., Ascertainability: 
Reading Between the Lines of Rule 23, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 253 (Mar. 25, 2011) 
(arguing in favor of ascertainability challenges and against the viability of fail-safe classes), 
and Erin L. Geller, Note, The Fail-Safe Class As an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 
81 Fordham L. Rev. 2769, 2769 (2013) (suggesting fail-safe classes should not be certified), 
with Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“If class actions could be 
defeated because membership was difficult to ascertain at the class certification stage, ‘there 
would be no such thing as a consumer class action.’”), and Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA, 
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The basic premise behind each of these objections is the same—at 
some point, class definitions will turn on plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief. 
The more harm-based definitions incorporate subjective eligibility com-
ponents, the more difficult certification becomes. For instance, the med-
ical monitoring class in the failed Castano litigation included “all nico-
tine dependent persons in the United States,”226 whereas the Donovan 
class successfully defined members as those with lung cancer who had a 
twenty pack-year smoking history.227 While both rely on plaintiffs’ eli-
gibility, nicotine dependence entails a subjective inquiry; evidence of 
smoking history and a lung-cancer diagnosis does not. 
Considering the class definition as an extension of conduct-related 
components and eligibility components could alleviate some of the 
premature “ascertainability” objections when a class is certified only as 
to conduct issues. What defendants cast as an unascertainable class is of-
ten a function of injecting eligibility components into the class definition 
and improperly commingling standing requirements with predominance 
concerns. 228 Thus, certifying an issue class based on a defendant’s con-
duct and defining members as those harmed by that conduct should be 
permissible so long as eligibility components become objectively verifi-
able or subject to a cy pres remedy in subsequent proceedings.229 For ex-
ample, had the Donovan court not certified a plenary tobacco class, in-
voking preclusion on conduct issues in follow-on proceedings would 
have been straightforward: Produce an affidavit as to a plaintiff’s num-
ber of pack-years and a lung-cancer diagnosis. If the certifying court is 
the same one trying follow-on proceedings, then the judge will be able 
 
287 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same), and Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the 
Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2359 (2014) (suggesting that 
not accepting fail-safe classes would eviscerate consumer class actions).  
226 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1996). 
227 Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, 268 F.R.D. 1, 9 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Class members can 
sign affidavits under penalty of perjury or submit doctors’ letters to detail their smoking his-
tories and medical status.”). 
228 E.g., Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 429–31 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(denying class certification in part because determining who was in the class would require 
“individualized fact-finding”); see also In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 
397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[C]lass membership is not feasibly ascertainable where it hinges on 
myriad medical factors individual to each class member.”). 
229 See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 3.07(c) (suggesting 
that when courts find that individual distributions to class members are not possible, parties 
should “identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by 
the class”). 
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to identify class members later, which is all that courts should require.230 
In multidistrict litigation, however, transferee judges should take special 
care to ensure that class members are objectively identifiable so that 
transferor judges can easily assess who is entitled to assert the issue 
class’s preclusive effect on remand. 
B. The Myth of Jackpot Justice 
Issue classes are controversial for both plaintiffs’ and defense attor-
neys.231 Although they are often thought to benefit plaintiffs by “black-
mailing” defendants into settling, in practice, issue classes are double-
edged swords. Even when a defendant brings all its resources to bear on 
summary judgment motions or bellwether trials, that strategy works only 
by dissuading plaintiffs’ attorneys to abandon their clients’ claims; it 
does nothing to systematically prevent further suits.232 But an issue class 
gives the defendant a rare opportunity to stymie further claims through 
preclusion—something nonclass litigation cannot do.233 
If the defendant is confident that it has done nothing wrong or that the 
plaintiffs’ evidence on conduct is weak, an issue class can undercut 
 
230 See, e.g., Bush v. Calloway Consol. Grp. River City, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-841-J-37MCR, 
2012 WL 1016871, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Class members need not actually be 
ascertained prior to certification, but each individual’s class membership must be ascertaina-
ble at some stage in the proceeding.”); Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 280 F.R.D. 
408, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“It is enough that the class be ascertainable . . . . [Class members 
who threw gift cards away] will be required to submit an appropriate affidavit, which can be 
evaluated during the claims administration process if [plaintiff] prevails at trial.”); Spagnola 
v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“While class members need not actual-
ly be ascertained prior to certification, they must be ascertainable at some stage of the pro-
ceeding.”); Mazur v. eBay Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same); Newberg on 
Class Actions § 3.3 (5th ed. 2014) (“[T]he court need not know the identity of each class 
member before certification; ascertainability requires only that the court be able to identify 
class members at some stage of the proceeding.”). But see Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 725 
F.3d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]lass certification will founder if the only proof of class 
membership is the say-so of putative class members or if ascertaining the class requires ex-
tensive and individualized fact-finding.”). 
231 Because of this, commentators have been skeptical about issue classes’ utility. See, e.g., 
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Beisner, Cabraser Weigh Comcast’s Impact; Flesh Out Typicality, 
Rise of Ascertainability, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 520 (May 9, 2014) (“Beisner said 
Rule 23(c)(4) won’t be used much because it basically has class proponents going through 
the expensive process of trial, and perhaps getting a liability determination, but there is no 
compensation for class members at the end.”).  
232 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008) (disapproving preclusion through vir-
tual representation). 
233 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979). 
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thousands of absent plaintiffs’ cases in a single trial just as bifurcating 
liability does in mass joinder.234 In the Bendectin litigation, for instance, 
the court used a trifurcated trial to test general causation first.235 When 
jurors found for the defendant, they extinguished 1,100 plaintiffs’ cases 
in a single twenty-two-day trial.236 Issue classes can also prevent defeats 
in unusually sympathetic plaintiffs’ cases from precluding relitigation 
across the board.237 The danger, however, is that issue classes eliminate 
outcome variability and increase the number of claims brought into the 
system, thereby leading to so-called “jackpot justice.”238 
The issue class is controversial for plaintiffs’ attorneys, too, because it 
vests initial litigation control in the hands of a few attorneys and, even 
following a win, class counsel may face additional hurdles before re-
ceiving fees. Still, by designating class counsel, courts delineate a prop-
erty right in the ultimate recovery in a way that nonclass, multidistrict 
litigation does not.239 Plus, Rule 23 requires judges to make specific 
findings regarding adequate representation, which has not occurred 
when appointing lead lawyers in multidistrict litigation.240 Nevertheless, 
when damages are substantial, the issue class has the potential to fore-
close subsequent litigation and wrest lucrative fees from nonclass coun-
sel. The following subsections consider these controversies, propose a 
method for addressing attorneys’ fees, and urge courts to make interloc-
utory appeals on the merits available after trying an issue class. 
1. Incentivizing Issue Classes with Attorneys’ Fees 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys create and fund class actions. Thus, invigorating 
issue classes requires incentivizing the plaintiffs’ bar. And, as is true for 
most attorneys, money motivates. But issue classes are uniquely situated 
 
234 A recent and rare issue class action trial took place in Ohio over moldy washing ma-
chines; the defendants won, precluding Ohio residents from relitigating the question. Perry 
Cooper, Ohio Moldy Washer Verdict Goes to Whirlpool; Class Will Pursue Claims in Other 
States, Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 1265 (Nov. 14, 2014). 
235 In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1988). 
236 Id. at 293. 
237 Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination 
Clause, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 499, 535 (1998). 
238 E.g., Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Ac-
tion, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 1013, 1015 (2007). 
239 See generally Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of 
Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1919, 1930 (2000) (“The presence of 
multiple competing attorneys creates the lack of a clear property right in recovery.”).  
240 Burch, supra note 1, at 88. 
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because they do not immediately produce a common fund from which 
successful class counsel can recover. 
In plenary classes, restitution theories justify class counsel’s fee: A 
class member who benefits from a class settlement will be unjustly en-
riched at counsel’s expense unless counsel receives a reasonable fee.241 
Similarly, in issue classes, counsel confers a substantial benefit on class 
members by successfully advancing the litigation.242 But there’s a 
catch—the common-fund doctrine typically requires a fund that “con-
sists of money or other property” before class members are required to 
contribute to the attorney’s costs of securing that fund.243 
For many issue classes, establishing a common fund after a successful 
class-wide trial on the defendant’s conduct will be a nonissue. Once they 
survive dispositive motions and become certified classes, many will set-
tle collectively in the same court and thereby create a common fund.244 
 
241 See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“The common-fund doctrine 
reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity . . . and it stands as a well-recognized ex-
ception to the general principle that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney’s fees.”); 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29 cmt. c (2011) (“Class coun-
sel assumes for this purpose the role of restitution claimant; the restitution claim is asserted 
by the counsel against the class. Counsel asserts that the class will be unjustly enriched, at 
counsel’s expense, unless a reasonable fee is awarded from the common fund.”); Charles 
Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 656, 
663–66 (1991). 
242 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.09 cmt. c (“The law-
yers in the aggregate proceeding will have conferred a substantial benefit on claimants inso-
far as that preclusive effect, in a given instance, inures to their advantage in other proceed-
ings.”).  
243 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29(1) cmt. a (2011); Alan 
Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Managing Fee 
Litigation 61 (2d ed. 2005). There have been cases where the attorney’s efforts did not bring 
the fund into creation, but preserved or enhanced the fund, reapportioned or distributed the 
fund, or even forced the defendant to take remedial action that moots the litigation. See, e.g., 
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) (allowing a successful plaintiff 
who only indirectly established others’ rights to a trust fund to recover fees); Koppel v. 
Wien, 743 F.2d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (permitting fees even where “no judgment or con-
sent decree was entered and the complaint was dismissed as moot”); Reiser v. Del Monte 
Props. Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that fees are still possible even 
where a defendant voluntarily acts in a way that favors plaintiff but moots the suit); Abbott, 
Puller & Myers v. Peyser, 124 F.2d 524, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (declining to apply the com-
mon fund doctrine to the case because the plaintiff did not “create, enhance, preserve, or pro-
tect [a] fund”). 
244 As Section II.C discussed, however, a subsequent settlement class would require a sep-
arate certification analysis. 
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Common funds have materialized in high-profile issue class successes 
and failures such as Engle and the blood products litigation.245 
In the original Engle litigation, tobacco company defendants could 
not afford to post a traditional bond to appeal the $145 billion class 
judgment against them, so class counsel negotiated a $600 million 
“bond” that would be distributed to the class even if the appeal failed.246 
The Florida Supreme Court decertified the Engle class on appeal, but let 
the class-wide trial’s issue-preclusive effect as to the companies’ con-
duct stand, which benefitted class members who pursued individual 
claims. Once the judge decided to disburse the “bond” (which grew to 
$800 million with interest), he awarded class attorneys $218 million in 
fees for creating the fund and establishing “multiple findings to be given 
res judicata effect in individually filed lawsuits,”247 even though counsel 
waived claims for additional fees from the preclusive effect of their 
work.248 Likewise, after the Seventh Circuit reversed issue certification 
on the defendants’ negligence and breach of duty in the hemophiliacs’ 
HIV litigation against pharmaceutical companies,249 the defendants ne-
gotiated a settlement class action that set aside $40 million for attorneys’ 
fees and costs.250 Thus, when a common fund exists and the certifying 
 
245 Infra notes 246–51 and accompanying text. 
246 Curt Anderson, Florida Smokers to Split $600M Tobacco Fund, Fla. Times-Union (Apr. 21, 
2008, 12:30 PM), http://jacksonville.com/apnews/stories/042108/D906BNHO0.shtml; Douglas 
Hanks, Anti-Tobacco Lawyers Awarded $218 Million Fee, Miami Herald, Apr. 17, 2008, at 
1C (“An appeals court overturned the verdict, but not before tobacco companies put up about 
$700 million to benefit class members even if the Rosenblatts lost the case.”); E-mail from 
Stanley Rosenblatt, Howard Engle’s attorney, to author (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:33 PM EDT) 
[hereinafter Rosenblatt E-mail] (on file with author). 
247 Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 (Fl. Cir. Ct. Apr. 18, 2008) (order 
granting petition of class counsel for attorneys’ fees) (on file with author); see also Billy 
Shields, Attorneys Awarded $218 Million for Work in Overturned Smokers’ Class Action 
That Laid Groundwork for Other Suits, Daily Rep. (Apr. 16, 2008), 
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=900005561391/Attorneys-Awarded-218-Million-for-
Work-in-Overturned-Smokers-Class-Action-That-Laid-Groundwork-for-Other-
Suits?slreturn=20150825122511 (detailing the history and the process that led to the fee 
award). 
248 Rosenblatt E-mail, supra note 246 (“Our fee was paid from the guaranteed portion of 
the appeal bonds and all class members received an allocation from the fund. We were urged 
by trial lawyers to also take a percentage of the fees from lawyers benefitting from our work 
through the binding findings. However, we waived any claims for additional fees.”). 
249 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). 
250 Hensler et al., supra note 83, at 304–06. Dissatisfied with this amount, which was far 
less than the $310 million they might have received based on their retainer agreements, sev-
eral plaintiffs’ attorneys tried to enforce their contingent fees by asserting a lien on their cli-
ents’ settlement proceeds. In re Factor VII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 
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court retains jurisdiction over that fund, class attorneys’ fees can pro-
ceed conventionally.251 
There is, however, little to no precedent for awarding fees once coun-
sel successfully litigates an issue class in multidistrict litigation and the 
remaining issues must be remanded.252 Even if remanded cases settle or 
end in a favorable judgment, there may be no common fund. Multiple 
attorneys compound the complications: While class counsel will have 
contributed to the outcome with issue preclusion, a plaintiff may have a 
different attorney who litigates her case in the transferor court, which 
raises questions about fee splitting. 
Nevertheless, one need not invent a theory out of whole cloth; charg-
ing liens and the common-benefit doctrine provide sound analogies for 
fashioning a coherent path forward. In most states, charging liens permit 
attorneys to assert liens against a client’s cause of action when they in-
vest labor and resources into the client’s case and produce a successful 
judgment or settlement.253 The lien attaches upon filing the initial case 
and accompanies the claim through judgment. Translated into the issue-
class context, filing the class complaint (the cause of action) would trig-
ger class counsel’s lien if counsel successfully litigated the issue, the is-
 
1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 1998). But Judge Grady, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, enjoined the 
attorneys from asserting liens that contradicted and undermined the settlement agreement. Id. 
at 1019. 
251 See generally Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that the common-fund doctrine is based on the idea that those who benefit from litigation 
should share in its costs). 
252 The Principles suggest that issue classes might “more closely approximate restitution-
ary principles” than the infamous “quasi-class action,” but noted that “best practices have yet 
to crystallize in real-world practice.” Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra 
note 42, § 2.09, reporter’s notes on cmt. c. Since that time, I have proposed best practices for 
fee allocations in multidistrict litigation. Burch, supra note 1, at 118–23. 
253 E.g., Froelich v. Graham, 80 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Ark. 2002); Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, 
Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384–85 (Fla. 1983); In re 
Estate of Estes, 731 S.E.2d 73, 74–75 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Consol. Constr. Servs., Inc. v. 
Simpson, 813 A.2d 260, 275 (Md. 2002); Mahesh v. Mills, 602 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999); St. Cloud Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Brutger, 488 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992); Musikoff v. Jay Parrino’s The Mint, LLC, 796 A.2d 866, 869–70 (N.J. 2002) 
(“An attorney’s statutory lien attaches broadly to any verdict, report, decision, award, judg-
ment or final order in his [or her] client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever 
hands they may come.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Estate of Dresner v. State, 242 
A.D.2d 627, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Rachel M. Kane, Attorneys at Law, 7 Am. Jur. 
§ 318 (2d ed. 2014); 7A Rachel Kane et al., Corpus Juris Secondum § 446 (2014); 2 Robert 
L. Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees § 12:13 (3d ed. 2014); cf. Rangel v. Save Mart, Inc., 142 P.3d 983, 
989 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (permitting a charging lien when “an attorney makes significant 
contributions to a case before being discharged”). 
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sue class inured to the plaintiff’s benefit through preclusion, and that the 
plaintiff ultimately received a favorable judgment or settlement 
award.254 The court conducting the follow-on proceedings could then 
apportion fees to class counsel and individual counsel based on quan-
tum-meruit principles.255 
Using charging liens to compensate issue-class counsel in multidis-
trict litigation can, however, present some limitations. First, when sub-
sequent courts have jurisdiction to apportion fees, transferor judges may 
be less familiar with class counsel’s effort and fees will lack uniformi-
ty.256 Before remanding cases, transferee judges might quell this fear, in 
part, by identifying likely fee-splitting scenarios and assigning fee per-
centages to those categories (settlement immediately upon remand ver-
sus a subsequent trial on eligibility components, for example).257 En-
compassing expected fees in an order triggers the law-of-the-case 
doctrine, which suggests transferor judges should not revisit the question 
absent changed circumstances—a possibility discussed more fully be-
low.258 Second, some states’ charging-lien statutes contain peculiarities 
 
254 A constructive lien generally follows “the judgment into whatever form it may as-
sume.” Froelich, 80 S.W.3d at 363; see also Trickett v. Laurita, 674 S.E.2d 218, 229 (W. Va. 
2009) (noting that a charging lien “follows the proceeds, wherever they may be found”). 
255 See, e.g., N. Pueblos Enters. v. Montgomery, 644 P.2d 1036, 1038 (N.M. 1982) (“Be-
cause a court exercises its equitable powers in enforcing an attorney’s charging lien, it may 
inquire into the reasonableness of the asserted fee for purposes of enforcing the lien.”); Peo-
ple v. Keeffe, 405 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1980) (“Generally, however, if an attorney is 
discharged without cause he will be allowed a charging lien upon the proceeds of the law-
suit, the amount to be determined on a quantum meruit basis at the conclusion of the case.”); 
infra notes 274–79 and accompanying text. 
256 Some states attach charging liens only to the judgment. E.g., Howell v. Howell, 365 
S.E.2d 181, 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“A charging lien is not available until there is a final 
judgment or decree to which the lien can attach.”). But even if the lien attaches to the cause 
of action, fees cannot be apportioned until the case concludes, which could happen in the 
transferor court. 
257 Transferee judges might also retain jurisdiction over fees if state substantive law per-
mits the charging lien to attach to the cause of action. See supra notes 253–55 and accompa-
nying text. 
258 Infra notes 289–93 and accompanying text; see also In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 
406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law of the case doctrine and general principles of comi-
ty, a successor judge has the same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, 
but should not overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later judge 
might have decided matters differently.” (quoting United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 
891 (5th Cir. 1982))); In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 443 
(3d Cir. 2009) (reversing the transferee judge’s decision to vacate the transferor judge’s de-
cision to compel arbitration because it violated the law of the case); David F. Herr, Multidis-
trict Litigation Manual § 10.17 (2015); Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 175, 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
1910 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1855 
like notifying the claimant about the lien in advance259 or requiring con-
tracts between the attorneys and clients.260 Including lien information in 
class notice might satisfy some states’ notice statutes,261 but requiring 
class attorneys to have a direct contractual relationship with class mem-
bers could inhibit fee recovery from clients in a minority of states, such 
as California.262 Even in California, however, class attorneys can recover 
contingent fees from a class member’s individual attorney on a quan-
tum-meruit basis if the matter concludes successfully.263 
Liens are not the only possibility for recovering issue-class counsel’s 
fees; the common-benefit doctrine complements the common-fund doc-
trine in cases where no common fund exists but plaintiffs’ attorneys con-
fer a substantial benefit on the class, such as indivisible remedies.264 In 
these cases, the common-benefit doctrine permits attorneys’ fees when 
the litigation confers “a substantial benefit on the members of an ascer-
tainable class, and where the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs 
proportionately among them.”265 Using this theory to compensate issue-
class counsel raises three questions: (1) what constitutes a substantial 
benefit; (2) how should fees be apportioned between class counsel and 
individual counsel; and (3) to what extent can a transferee judge who 
certifies an issue class retain jurisdiction to award counsel’s fees? 
 
§ 20.133 (“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made by 
the transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, doing so in the 
absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate the purposes of centralized 
pretrial proceedings.”); Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1978) (same). 
259 E.g., Thompson v. Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., 816 P.2d 532, 534–35 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
260 California is one such example. Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
532, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“Because an attorney’s lien is not automatic and requires a 
contract for its creation, a direct contractual relationship between the attorney and the client 
is essential.”). 
261 For notice to be timely, it generally must take place before the lawsuit ends in judgment 
or settlement. Levine v. Gonzalez, 901 So. 2d 969, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
262 Carroll, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534–35. 
263 Id.; Trimble v. Steinfeldt, 224 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
264 Hirsch & Sheehey, supra note 243, at 83–84; Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 975 F. Supp. 
802, 806 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“[A]n award of attorney’s fees and expenses under the common 
benefit doctrine does not depend on the specific nature of the relief granted the plaintiff. In-
deed, a fee award may be predicated on the grant of either monetary or equitable relief.”). 
265 Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393–94 (1970); see also Allen, 975 F. Supp. 
at 806 (citing Mills). For a discussion as to the ascertainability of the class, see supra Subsec-
tion III.A.3.  
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First, courts have not reached a clear consensus as to what constitutes 
a “substantial benefit,”266 but analogous situations suggest that an issue 
class’s preclusive effect would suffice. For example, when union mem-
bers sue their union, courts have determined that plaintiffs benefit other 
union members by establishing free speech rights267 and incentivizing 
unions to change their practices.268 And, in Sprague v. Ticonic National 
Bank, when a beneficiary litigated her rights against the defendant 
bank’s trust, her success indirectly established the rights of fourteen oth-
er beneficiaries.269 Although the other beneficiaries were not before the 
Court, the Court nevertheless had the power to award fees. As the Su-
preme Court explained: 
[W]hen such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit 
of others, the formalities of the litigation—the absence of an avowed 
class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis ra-
ther than through a decree—hardly touch the power of equity in doing 
justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation.270 
Comparatively, issue classes are less of a stretch. If plaintiffs’ attorneys 
establish conduct components through an issue class and materially ad-
vance the class members’ claims, counsel has conferred a substantial, 
issue-preclusive benefit.271 Failing to compensate class attorneys when 
plaintiffs cash in on that preclusive effect through a successful settle-
ment or verdict would unjustly enrich plaintiffs at counsel’s expense. 
Yet, the problem with the Sprague holding is obvious: Without ap-
propriate boundaries on stare decisis as a substantial benefit, the doctrine 
is limitless. How is a court to distinguish between compensable benefits 
and positive externalities? If, for instance, several lawyers won sizeable 
verdicts on their own in separate courts, the positive externalities from 
those trials could spill over to other cases and prompt an aggregate set-
tlement. But the beneficiaries would not pay for that externality. As the 
restitutionary basis for class-action awards makes plain, “[C]lass counsel 
 
266 The Principles do, however, reflect a consensus among American Law Institute mem-
bers that issue-class lawyers “will have conferred a substantial benefit on claimants insofar 
as that preclusive effect, in a given instance, inures to [claimants’] advantage in other pro-
ceedings.” Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.09 cmt. c. 
267 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973). 
268 Erkins v. Bryan, 785 F.2d 1538, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986). 
269 307 U.S. 161, 163 (1939). 
270 Id. at 167.  
271 Romberg, supra note 8, at 333. 
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may base a claim for fees only on the enhanced recovery obtained for a 
class: the difference, in other words, between what the class received in 
consequence of the lawyer’s intervention and what the class would have 
received without it.”272 Thus, differentiating compensable benefits from 
noncompensable spillovers requires courts to distinguish class members 
from the public as a whole (the ascertainability question covered previ-
ously273), and fairly apportion fees between class counsel and individual 
counsel. 
The common-benefit doctrine is grounded in quantum meruit, which 
should guide fee-apportionment decisions.274 Quantum meruit, “how 
much is merited,” compensates issue-class counsel for the benefit con-
ferred on class members and, because not all class members (or their in-
dividual attorneys) may benefit equally, allows judges to tailor awards 
accordingly.275 Customizing the fair value of fee awards depends on 
several factors: class counsel’s billing practices, work, and time spent;276 
class counsel’s opportunity costs and financial risk;277 the value class 
counsel conferred versus the amount of work the individual plaintiff’s 
attorney contributed to the outcome;278 and the plaintiff’s ultimate suc-
 
272 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 29 cmt. c (2011). 
273 See supra Subsection III.A.3. 
274Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (“The award of fees under the equitable fund doctrine is analogous to an action in 
quantum meruit . . . .”); 1 Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards § 2:1 (3d ed. 2014); Burch, su-
pra note 1, at 128–34. 
275 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 39 cmt. B(ii) (2011); see 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1361–62 (9th ed. 2009); Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action by Attor-
ney to Recover Fees on Quantum Meruit Basis, 16 Causes of Action 85, § 3 (1988). Because 
quantum meruit provides recovery only for the enhanced value to the class, if class counsel 
represents some class members individually, then she can recover only for “time spent on 
matters common to all claimants,” not for “time spent on developing or processing individu-
al issues in any case for an individual client.” In re Guidant Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 
MDL No. 05-1708 DWFAJB, 2006 WL 409229, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006). 
276 See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974) (as-
sessing time spent on a case); Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 788 F.2d 830, 843–45 (2d Cir. 1986) (examining specific services 
rendered); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (consid-
ering an attorney’s hourly billing rate); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 39 cmt. c (2000). 
277 E.g., Richardson v. Parish of Jefferson, 727 So. 2d 705, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 39 cmt. c (2000). 
278 Anderson v. Anchor Org. for Health Maint., 654 N.E.2d 675, 681–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); Krohn, supra note 275, § 4. See generally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 39 cmt. c (2000) (“The standard rate or hourly fee might be modified by other 
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cess. In fashioning these awards, judges should use the percentage 
method and adjust the percentage upward or downward depending on 
whether a case is remanded, if it subsequently goes to trial, if and when 
it settles, the role various attorneys played in achieving that settlement, 
and the overall cost-savings achieved through economies of scale.279 Of 
course, the judge must also ensure that the total contingent fee stays 
within the limits of the applicable state’s law. 
Tailoring issue-class counsel’s fee award raises the third issue: Can 
transferee judges retain jurisdiction over counsel’s fee once the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“Panel”) remands cases to transferor 
courts?280 This is by far the most difficult hurdle. While precedent on 
this point is limited, under the plain language of Title 28 of the United 
State Code, Section 1407, transferee judges can suggest that the Panel 
separate fees before remanding the rest of the case, which would allow 
transferee judges to retain jurisdiction over the fee issue.281 In practice, 
the Panel has allowed transferee judges to continue to preside over 
claims that benefit from uniform and consistent rulings, such as punitive 
damages.282 Although attorneys’ fees, like punitive damages, are not 
stand-alone claims, courts have recognized that “the meaning of ‘claim’ 
is not so circumscribed” as to include only a cause of action,283 which 
suggests that transferee judges might retain jurisdiction over fee awards. 
 
factors bearing on fairness, including success in the representation and whether the lawyer 
assumed part of the risk of the client’s loss, as in a contingent-fee contract.”). 
279 Burch, supra note 1, at 133. 
280 Even if transferee judges cannot retain jurisdiction over fees, they can still issue a court 
order that binds transferor judges through the law-of-the-case doctrine, and class counsel can 
still assert a charging lien. See supra notes 253–63 and accompanying text. 
281 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (allowing the Panel to “separate any claim” and “remand 
any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded”). 
282 E.g., In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the transferee judge 
refused to remand to ensure “uniform and consistent application of detailed medical criteria” 
to opt outs); In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 810 (3d Cir. 2000) (severing punitive damages); In 
re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1999) (severing punitive damages); In re Asbestos 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 
2014) (“When a case is remanded, it is the Court’s regular practice to sever any claims for 
punitive or exemplary damages and retain jurisdiction over these claims in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania.”). 
283 Collins, 233 F.3d at 811 (permitting transferee judge to retain jurisdiction over punitive 
damages and noting “a cause of action based upon negligence frequently is described as in-
cluding ‘claims’ for property damage, lost wages, medical bills, and pain and suffering. Nei-
ther the statute’s language nor the snippets of legislative history cited to us provides a basis 
for adopting the petitioners’ crabbed reading of the word”). If class attorneys are not com-
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On the other hand, allowing the transferee court to preside over fee is-
sues after remand (and presumably post-trial) may run afoul of Section 
1407 and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, 
Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach.284 As Lexecon explains, a transferee 
court’s authority is limited to “pretrial” proceedings and Section 1407 
“obligates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating court 
when, at the latest, those pretrial proceedings have run their course.”285 
Attorneys’ fees are post-resolution issues. Rule 23(h), which governs 
class counsel’s fee, requires that counsel move for fees “no later than 14 
days after the entry of judgment,” and that judges state their factual find-
ings and legal conclusions in accordance with Rule 52(a).286 While 
transferee judges would be intimately familiar with class counsel’s ef-
fort, without a settlement before remand, they could not make precise 
factual findings as to individual counsel’s subsequent post-remand ef-
forts.287 And while efficiency and public policy may counsel in favor of 
allowing transferee judges to retain jurisdiction over fees, neither reason 
proved persuasive in Lexecon.288 
Given these conflicting views, charting an appropriate course for 
awarding issue-class counsel’s attorneys’ fees that incentivizes represen-
tation but likewise hews to important doctrinal considerations is no easy 
feat. One compromise is to encourage transferee judges to issue inter-
locutory orders governing presumptive fee categories before remand.289 
As outlined above, judges could use quantum meruit principles to tailor 
these categories to the circumstances and list factors for transferor judg-
es to consider within each group.290 Although transferee judges would 
 
pensated for the benefit they conferred, they become the real parties in interest and own the 
fee cause of action. Conte, supra note 274, § 3:8. 
284 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
285 Id. at 34. 
286 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); id. 54(d)(2). 
287 Id. 52(a). 
288 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 32. 
289 Certifying courts have general authority to award fees under Rule 23(h). The Eighth 
Circuit has also ruled that “[i]t is well established that courts can impose liability for court-
appointed counsel’s fees on all plaintiffs benefitting from their services.” Walitalo v. 
Iacocca, 968 F.2d 741, 747 (8th Cir. 1992).  
290 Supra notes 274–79 and accompanying text. Judges might consider the incentives fees 
create as illustrated by the Eighth Circuit in Walitalo, 968 F.2d at 748–49; see also Manual 
for Complex Litigation, supra note 175, § 21.71 (“Compensating counsel for the actual bene-
fits conferred on the class members is the basis for awarding attorney fees.”); Principles of 
the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 3.13 cmt. b (“[T]he percentage method 
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lack both full information and jurisdiction to decide final fee awards, 
there are strong rationales for embedding likely fee-splitting scenarios in 
an interlocutory order. First, it lends some uniformity and predictability 
to fees subsequently awarded in dispersed transferor courts. Second, it 
provides some security for issue-class counsel who might be hesitant to 
undertake the endeavor for fear their payday may never come. Encom-
passing expected fees in an interlocutory order triggers at least some 
deference by transferor courts under the law-of-the-case doctrine,291 
clear error standards,292 or comity.293 These doctrines each suggest that 
transferor judges should not revisit the fee question absent changed cir-
cumstances.294 Finally, because issue-class counsel cannot control how 
others handle the case on remand, this approach incentivizes class attor-
neys to inform and represent as many individual clients as possible. This 
may make smaller claims more economical to litigate on remand, 
prompt careful notice to class members, and ensure faithful counsel so 
long as no structural conflicts exist among clients. 
To be sure, permitting the transferee court to give interlocutory orders 
pertaining to issue-class counsel’s fee does nothing to inhibit those out-
side the federal court’s jurisdiction (such as attorneys general litigating 
in state courts) from invoking issue preclusion and thereby free riding on 
class counsel’s efforts without cost. Accordingly, some have argued that 
the transferee court’s jurisdiction over the mutual defendant—and hence 
 
may not be feasible when the value of the common fund is difficult to assess. . . . In those 
circumstances, the court should use the lodestar method.”). 
291 E.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (using law of the case to 
determine transferor court’s deference to transferee court’s orders); In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 274–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Manual for Complex 
Litigation, supra note 175, § 20.133 (suggesting that the transferor judge can vacate or modi-
fy rulings by the transferee judge subject to “law of the case” considerations, but that trans-
feror courts should not do so absent a significant change in the circumstances because it 
would frustrate the purpose of centralization). 
292 E.g., Motorola Mobilty v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-C-6610, 2014 WL 258154, at 
*5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014); Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 
2013). 
293 E.g., Guddeck ex rel. Guddeck v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 34 F. Supp. 3d 990, 997 
(D. Minn. 2014) (suggesting that the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable to interlocutory 
orders but nonetheless noting that “considerations of comity and judicial economy weigh 
against disturbing [a transferor] court’s rulings” and applying a similar standard as In re 
Ford Motor Corp., 591 F.3d at 410–11 (alteration in original) (quoting Fenner v. Wyeth, 912 
F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 (E.D. Mo. 2012))); Fenner, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 799–800 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (refusing to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine but recognizing consid-
erations of comity and judicial economy).  
294 In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d at 411; Weigel, supra note 258, at 577. 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
1916 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1855 
the defendant’s assets—should act as a conduit to tax free riders.295 But 
this blurs the line between compensable benefits and noncompensable 
spillover effects and raises federalism concerns by asserting jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs and cases not properly before the court. As the Eighth 
Circuit has recognized, transferee courts cannot levy fee assessments on 
state-court plaintiffs via the defendant, for “[e]ven if the state plaintiffs’ 
attorneys participated in the MDL, the district court overseeing the 
MDL does not have authority over separate disputes between state-court 
plaintiffs and [the defendant].”296 In short, thwarting some free riding is 
not worth the cost to predictability or federalism. 
2. Resource Parity, Outcome Equality, and Appellate Brakes 
Ensuring mechanisms to award issue-class counsel’s fees incentivizes 
issue classes and evens out the typical resource imbalance between a 
single plaintiff and a corporate defendant. Because preclusion can attach 
to issues adjudicated in nonclass litigation, defendants have every reason 
to heavily invest in a single case. And unless the plaintiff’s attorney rep-
resents many similarly situated clients, a defendants’ investment incen-
tives may prove overpowering. Aggregate litigation is not cheap: Plain-
tiffs’ lawyers spend significant resources cultivating both generic and 
plaintiff-specific assets.297 Yet, issue classes that target the defendant’s 
conduct can defray generic costs like discovery expenses and encourage 
attorneys to invest in small-claims cases.298 
As parties’ investment incentives reach equilibrium, defendants raise 
concerns about undue settlement pressure.299 As a descriptive matter, 
 
295 Conte, supra note 274, § 2:1 (citing jurisdiction over a corporation as a means for cost-
spreading among shareholders in derivative suits as an example). 
296 In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2014). 
297 Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 13–14 (2007); Joe Nocera, 
Forget Fair; It’s Litigation as Usual, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2007, at C1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/business/17nocera.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (estimating that 
a single Vioxx case initially costs between $1 million and $1.5 million to develop, but after-
wards, others could litigate similar cases for around $200,000). 
298 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The realistic al-
ternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only 
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, 376 F.3d 656, 661 
(7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
299 These so-called “blackmail” claims vary substantially in substance, claiming at times 
that blackmail occurs because class actions are not triable, are triable, that claims are too 
small, that claims are too large, and that size does not matter. Charles Silver, “We’re Scared 
to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1360–61 (2003); see 
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certifying a class increases the likelihood of settlement by bringing 
claims into the system that individuals have not initiated on their own 
and by decreasing the variability in outcomes. Put simply, without a 
class, some people would never sue and those who did would reach var-
ious conclusions. Nevertheless, empirical researchers at the Federal Ju-
dicial Center have disputed whether this pressure is “undue” and found 
that “[j]udges spent about eleven times more time on class actions than 
on the average civil case.”300 So, it is unlikely that “the certification de-
cision itself, as opposed to the merits of the underlying claims, coerced 
settlements with any frequency.”301 
Issue classes not only bring claims into the system, they terminate the 
averaging effect of the “win-some, lose-some” mentality that allows a 
consensus about a defendant’s liability to emerge over time. Altering 
this laissez-faire paradigm has generated concerns about distributive jus-
tice and accuracy.302 Some have suggested that a single trial is just one 
point on a frequency distribution.303 Trying the same case 100 different 
times could yield varied results, thus a claim’s “true” value emerges on-
ly by averaging all the awards.304 From a distributive-justice perspective, 
plaintiffs may be over- or under-compensated by a single class-wide tri-
al. But that is true only if the class-wide trial adjudicates individuated 
eligibility components. Issue classes that target a defendant’s conduct 
would still permit a consensus to emerge as to pecuniary relief. 
From an accuracy perspective, a single trial on a defendant’s conduct 
might reach the wrong result, which could pressure defendants to settle 
prematurely. Perhaps. But consider a few counter-concerns. First, with-
 
also David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost 
Without Benefit, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 40 (discussing risk aversion to trial and suggest-
ing that “many erroneously claim that defendants are the exclusive or even the systematical-
ly likely ‘victims’ of such excessive bargaining leverage”). 
300 Thomas E. Willging et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four 
Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 61 (1996). 
301 Id.; see also Rosenberg, supra note 88, at 429–31 (providing a number of reasons to 
doubt that class actions actually exert blackmail pressure). 
302 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) (“One suit is 
an all-or-none affair, with high risk even if the parties supply all the information at their dis-
posal.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (raising accu-
racy concerns about issue classes); Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective 
Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1481, 1516 (1992) (decrying the all-or-nothing nature of 
a single trial); Stier, supra note 238, at 1018–28. 
303 Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits 
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815, 834 (1992). 
304 Id. 
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out issue classes, resource and information asymmetries persist between 
the parties.305 The settlement-pressure pendulum thus swings toward the 
plaintiff,306 who may be forced to settle on the cheap or forgo her claim 
entirely. This begs the question of which pressure point is less norma-
tively desirable in light of systemic compensation, deterrence, and pro-
cedural legitimacy goals. 
Second, issue classes decrease the possibility of inconsistent out-
comes and can thereby advance fundamental principles of fairness and 
outcome equality. Put plainly, like cases should be treated alike and cas-
es with similar facts should reach similar outcomes.307 Outcome dispari-
ty is no more apparent than when multiple cases reach inconsistent deci-
sions on a defendant’s uniform conduct.308 Of course, outcome 
inequality is expected if the inconsistencies reflect differences in states’ 
substantive laws.309 But states differ most over eligibility components.310 
So, certifying conduct components can strike a delicate balance between 
achieving uniform outcomes as to a defendant’s actions and allowing in-
consistencies based on states’ eligibility components to play out in sub-
sequent cases. 
Third, issue classes can enhance accuracy by alleviating undue set-
tlement pressure from frivolous claims. When class actions introduce 
meritorious claims into the system, they enhance compensation and de-
terrence and exert no “undue” pressure. But that changes if weak claims 
lurk within the masses. Some generic mechanisms already exist to weed 
out frivolous class allegations, such as motions to dismiss for failing to 
state a claim, Rule 11 sanctions, summary judgment, and Rule 23(f) 
 
305 See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1865, 1867 (2002) (“Our adversary system is premised upon the idea that the most ac-
curate and acceptable outcomes are produced by a real battle between equally-armed con-
testants . . . .”). 
306 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076–78 (1984) (describing 
the effects of resource imbalances on plaintiffs’ settlement incentives). 
307 See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 593–
94 (2012) (discussing the importance of outcome equality); Rubenstein, supra note 305, at 
1893 (“A common shibboleth of procedural justice is that ‘like cases should be treated 
alike.’”). 
308 Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
331, 357; Rubenstein, supra note 305, at 1893–94. 
309 Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 579 
(1996) (noting that when states differ over parties’ rights, “[s]uch differences are what a fed-
eral system is all about. They are not a ‘cost’ of the system”). 
310 See supra Subsection III.A.2 (discussing choice-of-law concerns).  
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class certification appeals.311 Nevertheless, an issue class on nonindivid-
uated conduct components with separate proceedings on individuated 
eligibility components provides a more precise tool to discourage plain-
tiffs’ attorneys from pursuing meritless individual claims. 
Although issue classes offer substantial benefits by evening out re-
source and information disparities, increasing outcome equality, and al-
leviating undue settlement pressure, they do place considerable stock in 
one trial. Juries and judges can err. And the outcome of that trial is not 
final in the appellate sense; the trial court (or courts) must still adjudi-
cate any remaining issues. Thus, lingering error can impose substantial 
cost on parties and judges. Accordingly, as the Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation suggest, issue classes “must be accompanied by the 
opportunity for interlocutory appeal as to any class-wide determination 
of the common issue on the merits.”312 This not only enhances procedur-
al justice and corrects error,313 but also prevents the added cost of unrav-
eling subsequent verdicts that rely on the integrity of the issue class 
judgment. 
C. Disaggregating 
By their nature, issue classes leave some questions unresolved. The 
economic viability and complexity of resolving those remaining ques-
tions hinges on three variables: (1) whether the follow-on proceedings 
take place in the same court that certified the issue class or in courts dis-
persed throughout the country; (2) whether the same lawyer (or group of 
lawyers) handles subsequent litigation; and (3) whether the remaining 
issues require some level of collectivization to maintain their economic 
worth. 
Some subsequent proceedings will be straightforward. When federal 
courts litigate federal questions that would entitle class members to con-
 
311 Rule 23(f) allows parties to appeal the certification decision, which principally benefits 
defendants. Appellate courts have accepted sixty-nine percent of defendants’ appeals (and 
only thirty-one percent of plaintiffs’). Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 741 (2013). Once accepted, defendants successfully reversed certifi-
cation seventy percent of the time, but, when plaintiffs appealed, they prevailed only thirty 
percent of the time. Id. 
312 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.09 cmt. b. The Sub-
committee on Rule 23 has indicated a move in this direction. Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Civil Procedure, supra note 7, at 39–41. 
313 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 Wake For-
est L. Rev. 1, 35–37 (2009). 
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siderable damages, plaintiffs’ attorneys have every incentive to recruit 
and represent those claimants in additional proceedings. McReynolds v. 
Merrill Lynch is a prototypical illustration: Once the district court de-
termined whether Merrill Lynch’s teaming and account distribution pol-
icies violated Title VII, “[e]ach class member would have to prove that 
his compensation had been adversely affected by the corporate policies, 
and by how much,” but because most brokers “earn at least $100,000 a 
year,” individual suits were possible.314 Moreover, those claims would 
continue in the same court that certified the issue class, which promotes 
consistency and efficiency, and should inform the certifying court’s ini-
tial superiority analysis. 
Issue classes can also further accuracy, efficiency, and federalism 
principles when various lawyers take the helm and litigate subsequent 
proceedings in courts throughout the country. Dispersed proceedings are 
most likely when (1) a transferee judge certifies an issue in multidistrict 
litigation and must remand cases to their transferor courts when class-
wide proceedings conclude, and (2) states’ attorneys general rely on 
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion to litigate parens patriae cases in 
state courts. Litigating cases before separate juries—regardless of 
whether the case remains before the same judge—can raise Seventh 
Amendment Reexamination Clause concerns. Accordingly, this Section 
considers each issue in turn. 
1. Remanding Multidistrict Litigation to Transferor Courts 
Remanding multidistrict litigation after resolving common conduct is-
sues on a class-wide basis could make it uneconomical for some plain-
tiffs to pursue individual claims. But a remand need not prompt a slew 
of individual suits. Transferor courts within the same state could coordi-
nate and resolve remanded claims on an aggregated basis under Section 
1404(a) and Rule 42.315 Remand strips away most of the nagging choice-
of-law concerns that arise on the national level, which allows transferor 
courts to consider state-specific class actions on eligibility compo-
nents.316 Moreover, follow-on proceedings could litigate the individuat-
 
314 672 F.3d 482, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2012). 
315 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 667, 692 (2013). 
316 Even though transferee courts rarely remand cases, when they have done so, they have 
cited the need for transferor courts to consider state-specific classes as a reason to remand. 
See In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 74–75 (D. Me. 
2011); In re Chrysler LLC 2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Prods. Liab. Litig., 598 
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ed personal-injury claims that plaintiffs’ attorneys often relinquish in 
hopes of garnering plenary class certification.317 
Conducting subsequent litigation in the transferor courts can alleviate 
both procedural and substantive concerns with issue classes. When “lo-
cal”318 judges interpret state laws and conduct trials within the affected 
community, it satisfies democratic concerns about community involve-
ment in fact finding and should produce greater accuracy, less error, and 
increased fidelity to those laws. For example, litigating eligibility com-
ponents in dispersed courts can correct error by bypassing nonappeala-
ble aggregate settlements, building secondary judicial review into the 
process, and enabling judges most familiar with a state’s law to interpret 
and apply that law.319 As Judge Easterbrook explained in In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., “The central planning model—one case, one court, 
one set of rules, one settlement price for all involved—suppresses in-
formation that is vital to accurate resolution.”320 This is principally true 
with regard to eligibility components, where states’ laws differ most. 
Plus, without the onslaught of nationwide claims, transferor courts can 
dismiss cases that fail under specific state provisions. 
2. Coordinating the Public and Private Regulatory Response 
Because issue classes preclude subsequent cases from relitigating the 
same issues, they have the potential to bridge jurisdictional bounda-
 
F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373–74 (J.P.M.L. 2009). But see Balt. Cnty v. AT&T Corp., 735 
F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1098–99 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (“In this multi-district litigation, No. 1313, the 
court has presided over more than 40 state-wide class actions settlements through final 
judgments and administration of the settlements.”). 
317 E.g., Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 375–76 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Zachery 
v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
318 By “local,” I mean federal transferor judges sitting within the state whose laws will 
control the dispute’s outcome. 
319 E.g., Light Cigarettes, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 77. Remanding to transferor courts builds 
some judicial redundancy into adjudication, which can lead to better decisions and correct 
erroneous interpretations of state law. See, e.g., Gottschall v. Crane Co., No. A136516, 2014 
WL 5025725, at *43–46 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that the transferee judge mis-
applied an eligibility element—the sophisticated user doctrine—and refused to bind the 
plaintiff to that erroneous opinion through preclusion). On the benefits of judicial redundan-
cy, see Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and In-
novation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 646–57 (1981); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the 
Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2369, 2373 (2008). For more 
information on these points, see Burch, supra note 18. 
320 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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ries.321 When state attorneys general initiate parens patriae actions, they 
can help overcome the prism effect that makes it difficult for the private 
sector to hold defendants accountable.322 But the cacophony of public 
and private litigants pushing different agendas while targeting the same 
conduct can lead to discord, inconsistent opinions, wasted litigant and 
judicial resources, and unpredictable preclusion. 
Take the General Motors ignition switch debacle, for example: Short-
ly after a massive recall, General Motors was subject to five different 
governmental probes and fifty-five class action lawsuits.323 Two months 
later, the number of state investigations alone swelled from one to nine, 
all of which proceeded in tandem alongside the other suits.324 Courts’ 
ability to formally coordinate these actions is jurisdictionally limited 
since state attorneys general often craft their claims to defeat removal to 
federal court.325 
 
321 State and federal courts must afford sister courts full faith and credit. U.S. Const. art. 
IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
322 See generally Gilles & Friedman, supra note 2, at 668 (“So state AGs can use parens 
patriae to get at many or most of the cases that would otherwise be the subject of class ac-
tions, and they can do so unconstrained by class action waivers and, at least for now, the oth-
er, lesser challenges that afflict class actions.”). 
323 Sarah N. Lynch, GM Says Facing Multiple Probes into Recent Recalls, Reuters 
(Apr. 24, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/us-gm-recall-investigation-
idUSBREA3N1YU20140424. 
324 GM Ignition-Switch Defect Response Probed by 9 States, Automotive News (June 
12, 2014), http://europe.autonews.com/article/20140612/OEM11/140619951/gm-ignition-switch-
defect-response-probed-by-9-states. 
325 See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014); 
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668–69 (E.D. La. 2012) (concluding 
that the Kentucky attorney general’s action against Merck did not “fall within the ‘slim cate-
gory’ defined by Grable” and that it merely required the court to interpret FDCA provi-
sions). Some courts addressing pharmaceutical products liability cases have held that federal 
question jurisdiction exists under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering 
& Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 313–16 (2005), because they present a substantial and dis-
puted federal issue and intricate federal regulatory scheme. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 398378, at *3–5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2008). But see 
Kentucky ex rel. Conway v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 978 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794 (W.D. Ky. 2013) 
(distinguishing Zyprexa and citing Vioxx as favorable authority because “Kentucky sought 
‘civil penalties pursuant to the KCPA and not federally-funded Medicaid reimbursement 
payments’” (quoting Vioxx, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 669)); Vermont v. McGrx, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-
95, 2010 WL 3767794, at *6 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2010) (distinguishing Zyprexa and concluding 
that “the State’s claims in the instant case do not involve a similar federal mandate, do not 
overlap with the responsibilities of a federal agency, and do not present questions of national 
uniformity”). 
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But private and public attorneys have historically benefitted from one 
another’s efforts through issue preclusion. For instance, in Parklane Ho-
siery, Inc. v. Shore,326 once the Securities and Exchange Commission 
successfully proved that Parklane Hosiery issued a materially false and 
misleading proxy statement, private litigants did not need to relitigate 
that issue.327 Although the roles are often reversed today—parens patri-
ae claims increasingly follow in the wake of private litigation and some-
times settle alongside private cases in a comprehensive agreement—
preclusion’s role stays consistent.328 
The large number of states that do not require mutuality329 to assert is-
sue preclusion afford public regulators the luxury of free riding on pri-
vate counsel’s efforts, which can promote consistency as well as sub-
stantive goals. State attorneys general are uniquely positioned to litigate 
small claims that are not economically viable standing alone, and can 
thus avoid sticky problems with private cy pres awards.330 While an is-
sue class proves helpful only insofar as states do not require mutual par-
ties,331 it can reduce inconsistent results across multiple jurisdictions and 
remedy, in part, the prism effect described in Part I. 
3. Ensuring Adequate Representation and Preclusion 
Achieving consistency and efficiency is possible only if issue classes 
actually preclude relitigation. While preclusion is relatively straightfor-
ward for class members, states’ attorneys general typically are not class 
members. Nevertheless, when defendants settle—with state attorneys or 
in a class action—they tend to invoke claim preclusion to prevent the 
nonsettling parties from relitigating on the theory they were adequately 
 
326 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
327 Id. at 332–33. 
328 See Jay L. Himes, When Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue Standing, 
41 Rutgers L.J. 187, 217 (2009) (“[I]n recent years, the states’ major pharmaceutical-drug 
antitrust cases have followed on-going private litigations and were generally settled along 
with the private actions.”); Jef Feeley & David Voreacos, Merck to Plead Guilty, Pay $950 
Million in U.S. Vioxx Probe, Bloomberg Bus. (Nov. 23, 2011, 9:44 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-22/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-to-
settle-u-s-government-s-vioxx-probe (noting that in addition to settling private claims, “[t]he 
company agreed in 2008 to pay $58 million to settle claims by 29 states”). 
329 See supra note 211 (listing states that do not require mutuality). 
330 See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 3.07(b) (discussing 
when cy pres awards are appropriate). 
331 See supra note 211 (listing states that permit non-mutual offensive issue preclusion). 
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represented in the first suit.332 Precluding private suits in the wake of a 
parens patriae action can be particularly problematic since those suits 
have not been subjected to Rule 23’s adequacy requirement and attor-
neys general may prioritize political agendas and quick resolution over 
private claimants’ interests.333 
Deciphering adequate representation in subsequent suits is not an in-
surmountable hurdle. As I have described elsewhere,334 these inquiries 
should turn on the nature of the rights initially at stake. If the right in the 
first suit arises from an aggregate harm—a harm that affects a group of 
people equally and collectively—and demands an indivisible remedy, 
then courts should tolerate greater conflicts and preclude subsequent in-
dividual claims.335 When the harm and remedy are consistent for all 
class members or state citizens, if one group member is inadequately 
represented then they all are. Thus inadequate representation occurs only 
when lawyers or named representatives act contrary to the group’s best 
interests or try to represent an over-inclusive group.336 
For instance, when state actors litigate aggregate harms like water 
rights or subway fares, they typically demand indivisible remedies or 
statutory penalties that treat affected victims uniformly.337 The same is 
true when a public or private actor litigates a defendant’s conduct com-
ponents: So long as a defendant’s conduct was uniform, all regulators 
have shared incentives to “prosecute” that conduct. Thus, representation 
would be inadequate only if the lawyers or the named representatives 
acted contrary to the group’s best interests or attempted to represent an 
over-inclusive, noncohesive group where a defendant’s conduct toward 
the members varied.338 Consequently, when issue classes or parens pa-
triae suits litigate conduct components or aggregate rights, judges 
 
332 E.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 
440, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that the water authority was precluded by previous 
state litigation). Compare Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 
551–52 (Ga. 2006) (precluding an individual tobacco plaintiff from recovering punitive 
damages), with Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 392–93 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) (permitting an individual tobacco plaintiff to recover punitive damages). 
333 Lemos, supra note 63, at 532–36; Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Pub-
lic Enforcement, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 858–62 (2014); Zimmerman, supra note 63, at 217. 
334 Burch, supra note 78, at 3070–77. 
335 Id. at 3057–61. 
336 Id. at 3051–57. 
337 See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (discussing public rights). 
338 Burch, supra note 78, at 3061, 3070–77. 
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should presume that the regulator adequately represents those collective 
rights and tolerate greater intra-group conflicts.339 
Conversely, when state attorneys general pursue private, individual 
rights—as they might under their quasi-sovereign interests340—courts 
should not preclude affected individuals from pursuing their own claim 
if a structural conflict existed,341 there was an inequitable allocation of 
divisible remedies, the attorney general lacked a sufficient motive to 
pursue the case, or the prosecution was completely inept.342 This allows 
attorneys general the latitude to pursue a wide array of harms (including 
small claims that might otherwise be under-enforced), but preserves citi-
zens’ individual right to sue if the litigation forecloses their rights with-
out adequate representation. 
4. Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause Concerns 
For a handful of courts, the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination 
Clause can pose one final hurdle to the greater use of issue classes.343 
Closely tied to the right to a jury trial and designed to prevent juries’ de-
cisions from being eviscerated through subsequent legislative or judicial 
abuse,344 the Reexamination Clause states, “[N]o fact tried by a jury, 
 
339 See id. at 3077. This would, of course, cover instances in which the public actor traded 
the public interest for timely campaign contributions. 
340 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
341 See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 42, § 2.07(a). That is, a 
conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who would represent 
claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would present a 
significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the 
litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evalua-
tion of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers them-
selves.” Id. 
342 See id. § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(B).  
343 See, e.g., Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 509 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303–04 (7th Cir. 1995)) (positing that the bifur-
cation plan might violate the Seventh Amendment); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the analysis in Rhone-Poulenc); Rhone-Poulenc, 51 
F.3d at 1303–04 (arguing that judges cannot “divide issues between separate trials in such a 
way that the same issue is reexamined by different juries”). But see Valentino v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that the decision and concerns 
in Rhone-Poulenc “may not be fully in line with the law of this circuit”). 
344 See Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, at 42 (1990) 
(“In three of the New England states—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island—
there was an opportunity for multiple trials. The decision, either real or sham, resulting from 
a trial in an inferior tribunal could be appealed to a superior tribunal, where a second and 
entirely new trial could be had.”). 
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shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.”345 
In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reversed is-
sue-class certification based, in part, on the fear that subsequent juries 
would violate the Reexamination Clause by reconsidering facts relating 
to a defendant’s conduct when hearing evidence on the plaintiffs’ eligi-
bility for relief.346 Breaching a duty, Judge Posner thought, was concep-
tually intertwined with proximate cause and negligence.347 Pragmatical-
ly, the issue class made little sense: The follow-on cases would have to 
rehash much of the same evidence, which meant the class did not mate-
rially advance the claims’ resolution. But that pragmatic concern should 
not rise to the level of a constitutional one.348 
Shedding light on the distinction between pragmatic and constitution-
al concerns requires properly construing the word “fact” in the Reexam-
ination Clause itself. Jurors are the fact finders: they sift through the 
facts of the case, apply them to a claim’s legal elements, and determine 
whether those elements have been satisfied.349 Reexamining much of the 
same evidence in subsequent proceedings bears on whether an issue 
class materially advances the litigation, but it does not mean that a sec-
ond jury will decide the same legal element.350 Reexamination Clause 
violations should occur only if subsequent juries reexamine a legal ele-
ment determined by the issue class.351 That might happen, for example, 
 
345 U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
346 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1302–04. 
347 Id. at 1303. But see Campos, supra note 88, at 1073. 
348 The Seventh Circuit’s more recent cases have implicitly abandoned the Seventh 
Amendment Reexamination Clause concerns as the circuit has embraced the greater use of 
issue classes. E.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A 
determination of liability could be followed by individual hearings to determine the damages 
sustained by each class member.”); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2012) (certifying an issue class and noting “the next stage 
of the litigation, should the class-wide issue be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, will be 
hundreds of separate suits for backpay”); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 
911 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If there are genuinely common issues . . . then it makes good sense, 
especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the 
remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.”).  
349 Woolley, supra note 237, at 520–22. 
350 Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 169 n.13 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Trying a bifurcated claim before separate juries does not run afoul of the Seventh Amend-
ment, but a ‘given [factual] issue may not be tried by different, successive juries.’” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268 (2d Cir. 1999))).  
351 Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1128 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The 
prohibition is not against having two juries review the same evidence, but rather against hav-
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2015] Constructing Issue Classes 1927 
if the issue class verdict form is imprecise and muddies which elements 
were actually decided so that subsequent juries might be tasked with re-
determining the same elements.352 But that risk can be avoided by using 
special verdict forms and instructing subsequent juries as to the first ju-
ry’s findings.353 
CONCLUSION 
Federalism concerns and jurisdictional restrictions make it challeng-
ing for most private and state regulators to capture the full scope of any 
national corporate misconduct. This leads to dueling concerns: too few 
successful actions in areas typically left to private enforcement like 
products liability, consumer protection, and employment discrimination; 
and too many competing lawsuits in cases of blatant, high-profile 
wrongdoing. Simultaneous concerns about both over- and under-
enforcement proliferate alongside anxieties about inconsistent judg-
ments, inefficient resource use, and inadequate representation. 
Yet, issue classes are well positioned to enhance the enforcement 
landscape in two ways. First, they can short-circuit the prism effect that 
has hobbled private class actions in recent years. Rethinking class cohe-
sion and certifying core conduct elements when a defendant’s actions 
are uniform not only revives class actions by divorcing common compo-
nents from individuated eligibility components, but also equips both 
plaintiffs and defendants with a powerful procedural weapon: two-way 
preclusion. It is this two-way preclusion that promises the second bene-
fit. So long as appellate review on the merits exists to correct error and 
courts take appropriate steps to ensure adequate representation, litigating 
uniform conduct in a single class-wide trial can mute the discord of 
 
ing two juries decide the same essential issues.” (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (D. Del. 1984)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
352 See, e.g., Blyden, 186 F.3d at 257, 268–69 (noting that both the liability jury and the 
damages juries were tasked with deciding which acts constituted “reprisals” after the 1971 
riot in Attica prison and that there was a “real possibility” that what constituted a reprisal 
would be relitigated by subsequent juries); Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 36 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing that “different issues can be submitted to different juries as long 
as they are not presented in a way that causes juror confusion or uncertainty”); Steven S. 
Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 705, 736–37 (2000) (noting the need to 
“carefully define the roles of the two juries” and “carefully craft the verdict form for the first 
jury so that the second jury knows what has been decided already”). 
353 Woolley, supra note 237, at 542. 
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overlapping regulators through preclusion. While subsequent suits may 
persist, in the majority of states that have abandoned the mutuality re-
quirement, courts need not relitigate the same conduct-related questions. 
Efficient resource use and consistent judgments follow accordingly. 
